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Abstract 
This thesis examines the relationship between internal R&D and external R&D contracting, 
as well as internal R&D and R&D collaboration for a comprehensive panel of Norwegian 
firms. Special emphasis is put on multinational firms with R&D ties with foreign affiliates 
within their enterprises. The data is drawn from the R&D and innovation surveys, conducted 
and provided by Statistics Norway. Estimating the effect of external R&D sources on 
internal R&D, we find that neither foreign R&D contracting nor foreign R&D cooperation 
within multinational enterprises affect internal R&D significantly. We find a substitutable 
relationship between these external R&D sources and internal R&D. Other external R&D 
sources are found to be positively related to internal R&D expenditures, and both 
complementary and substitutable relationships are found between these external R&D 
sources and internal R&D. We conclude that the need for absorptive capacity seems to be an 
underlying driver for the increase in internal R&D due to all forms of external R&D activity. 
Firms with multinational R&D ties seem to have high levels of internal R&D and absorptive 
capacity. As multinational R&D ties have substitutable properties with internal R&D, 
multinational R&D sourcing may lead to a displacement of domestic internal R&D activity.  
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
The growth of multinational enterprises in developed countries the recent decades and the 
following internationalization of R&D have attracted interest from academics as well as 
policy makers. The rise of foreign ownership shifts the strategic decision making from 
domestic to foreign headquarters, and may create uncertainty in future domestic employment 
and investment. On the other side, internationalization of R&D may increase technology 
sharing and dispersion, and hence promote domestic R&D investment, innovation and 
productivity growth. 
 
During the last decade, internal R&D activity among Norwegian firms has increased slowly, 
while R&D contracting fluctuated slightly. Graph 1.1 shows an upward trend in internal 
R&D expenditures from 1997 to 2009. External R&D purchases were reduced in the first 
part of the decade, but rose slightly towards 2009. A similar pattern is seen for R&D 
purchased from foreign firms within the same enterprise, referred to as multinational R&D 
contracting..   
 
Figure 1.1: R&D expenditures. Bn. 2009NOK. 
 
Source: R&D and innovation surveys, Statistics Norway. External multinational refers to R&D expenditures 
from foreign firms within the same enterprise. The survey covers all Norwegian firms with more than 50 
employees, and a sample of firms with 10-49 employees. Aggregation based on weights provided by Statistics 
Norway. Deflation in accordance with price indices for R&D from “Indikatorrapporten”.   
 
R&D ties with external partners seem important for R&D active firms. Around 60 percent of 
Norwegian multinational firms contract out R&D or cooperates in R&D, or both, seen in the 
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right panel of figure 1.2. A small decrease in the frequency appears in the last part of the 
decade. For all firms, a slight reduction in the frequency of external R&D ties is seen in the 
left panel of same figure. 
 
Figure 1.2: Frequency of firms with external R&D ties 
  
Source: R&D and innovation surveys, Statistics Norway. External R&D contracting refers to buying R&D 
from externals. R&D cooperation refers to collaborate in R&D. R&D ties refers to either R&D contracting or 
cooperation, or both. The survey covers all Norwegian firms with more than 50 employees, and a sample of 
firms with 10-49 employees. Aggregation based on weights provided by Statistics Norway. 
 
 
Multinational firms are thought to access foreign R&D easier. However, as figure 1.3 shows, 
for Norwegian multinationals there is no sign of increased inflow of foreign R&D through 
their multinational enterprises at the aggregate level. The Norwegian Government has 
established several programs in order to increase R&D activity in Norwegian firms. It also 
wants to attract foreign investment in R&D (St.meld. nr. 7 2008-2009:60). Firms with 
foreign ownership contribute a larger share of R&D expenditures. According to Statistics 
Norway (2009) R&D conducted by these firms constitute 30 percent of total R&D 
investments in Norway in 2007. Norwegian subsidiaries account for a considerable part – 30 
percent – of total external R&D as well, but differ from other firms regarding sources of 
R&D with a more international orientation. Multinational subsidiaries have a higher 
propensity to acquire foreign R&D – from either within or outside the multinational 
enterprise – according to Statistics Norway (2009). Looking at foreign R&D acquisition 
from within multinational enterprises, R&D purchases from foreign firms within the same 
enterprise still constitute a considerable share of external R&D purchases for Norwegian 
firms. Figure 1.3 shows that this ratio decreased from around 23 percent in 1997 to 11 
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percent in 2003, before increasing slowly to 17 percent in 2009. The sharp reduction in the 
first part of last decade is due to a relatively larger reduction for R&D contracted out to 
foreign firms within the same enterprise than the reduction in R&D contracted out to other 
firms outside the multinational enterprise, as seen in figure 1.3. Figure 1.4 shows that firms 
with multinational R&D ties constituted between 11 and 7 percent of all firms, and around 
40 percent of R&D active firms from 1997 to 2009. Multinational R&D collaboration seems 
to be far less frequent than contracting foreign R&D from same enterprise.  
 
Figure 1.3 External R&D expenditures. Bn. 2009NOK.  
  
Source: R&D and innovation surveys, Statistics Norway.  Deflation in accordance with price indices for R&D 
from “Indikatorrapporten”. Multinational R&D contracting refers to R&D contracting with foreign firms within 
the same enterprise, while non-multinational R&D contracting refers to R&D contracting with other partners.  
 
Figure 1.4: Frequency of firms with multinational R&D ties 
  
Source: R&D and innovation surveys, Statistics Norway. Multinational R&D contracting refers to buying R&D 
from a foreign firm within the same enterprise. Multinational R&D contracting refers to collaborate in R&D 
with the same kind of firm. R&D ties refers to either multinational R&D contracting or cooperation, or both. 
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Firms with multinational R&D ties performs on average far more internal R&D than firms 
with other forms of external R&D ties, and firms only performing internal R&D. Figure 1.5 
shows that firms with multinational R&D ties on average spent around 25 million NOK on 
internal R&D in the first half of last decade, and increased investments to 37 million NOK in 
2009. Average internal R&D expenditures for firms with other forms of external R&D 
decreased around year 2000, then stabilized throughout the decade at approximately five 
million NOK per year. Average internal R&D expenditures for firms without external R&D 
ties fluctuated on levels somewhat below five million NOK. Norwegian subsidiaries are 
mainly represented among large and medium sized firms which perform more R&D than 
small firms according to Statistics Norway (2009). This may explain the large averages for 
firms with multinational R&D. However, the results are not surprising given the fact that 
large firms, of which a relatively large share is multinational, are found to contribute to the 
main share of R&D in Norway (Herstad and Nås, 2007). 
 
Figure 1.5: Average internal R&D expenditures. Mn. 2009NOK. 
 
Source: R&D and innovation surveys, Statistics Norway. Multinational R&D tie refers to firms either 
purchasing R&D from, or collaborates in R&D with, a foreign firm within the same enterprise, or both. Non-
multinational external R&D tie refers to either R&D purchasing or R&D cooperation with all other firms.  
Deflation in accordance with price indices for R&D from “Indikatorrapporten”.   
 
Somewhat surprising, the descriptive statistics show only weak signs for firms with 
multinational R&D ties to be superior in innovativeness relative to firms with other forms of 
external R&D ties or firms who rely solely on conducting internal R&D. Norwegian 
multinationals hold an advantage in R&D by their internal access to foreign knowledge and 
technology within their enterprise. One should therefore expect these to be more innovative 
than other firms. Figure 1.6 gives no such indication when measuring innovativeness as the 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
1997 1999 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Multinational R&D tie
Non-multinational external R&D tie
Internal R&D only
 11 
share of total sales attributable to new products, but a weak indication when innovativeness 
is measured as frequency of making process or product innovation. External R&D ties allow 
firms to gain access to a broader pool of resources and knowledge, possibly at a lower cost, 
and to share the risk of performing R&D with other R&D partners. Thus, one should expect 
firms with other external R&D ties to be more innovative than firms only conducting internal 
R&D. This does not seem to be the case for Norwegian firms as shown in figure 1.6.  
 
Figure 1.6: Innovativeness  
   
Source: R&D and innovation surveys, Statistics Norway. New sales refers to share of total sales attributed to 
new or significantly improved products the current or last two years. Innovation refers to whether or not the 
firm has made any process or product innovations the current or last two years. Multinational R&D tie refers to 
firms either purchasing R&D from, or collaborates in R&D with, a foreign firm within the same enterprise, or 
both. Non-multinational external R&D tie refers to either R&D purchasing or R&D cooperation with all other 
firms.  
 
We examine the impact of acquiring external R&D on R&D investment in Norway. We put 
special emphasis on the acquisition of foreign R&D within multinational firms, and treat 
external R&D purchases and R&D cooperation separately. As described in the beginning of 
this section, internationalization of R&D by multinational enterprises may promote domestic 
R&D investment, innovation and productivity growth. Additional investments in internal 
R&D may be needed in order to absorb new technology and knowledge. Technology sharing 
and dispersion may improve and complement existing technology within the firms, also 
leading to increased investment in R&D. The high frequency and level of external R&D 
contracting in general should also promote technology sharing and dispersion for Norwegian 
firms. Hence, external R&D contracting may lead to a similar need for, and stimulus of, 
internal R&D investment. On the other hand, firms may use external R&D sources – from 
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either within or outside the multinational enterprise – as a substitute for internal R&D 
activity. External R&D sourcing could therefore both increase and displace R&D activity in 
Norway.  
 
1.2 Data 
The data used in this thesis comes from R&D and innovation surveys conducted by Statistics 
Norway, with 49 990 observations covering R&D activity in 18,410 Norwegian firms in 
1997, 1999 and 2001 – 2009. The questionnaire is answered by the majority of Norwegian 
firms, but the number of respondents varies from year to year
1
. The questions in the survey 
differ to some extent as well, however the questions of most interest are asked in all years. 
For our analysis we have removed all observations for firms with less than 10 employees, 
reducing the total number of observations to 46 792. This is in line with the guidelines 
proposed by SSB when working with the R&D and Innovation survey
2
.  
 
The question sheets are constructed in accordance with the data collection guidelines 
proposed by the Frascati-manual and the Oslo-manual. The Frascati-manual provides the 
basis for the part of the questionnaire concerning R&D, whereas the Oslo-manual dictates 
the questions relating to innovation activity.  
 
A further presentation of the data and variables will be given in section 3.2 and 4.2. 
 
1.3 Outline 
The thesis is divided in five parts. The next section gives a summary of relevant theory and 
literature. In chapter 3 we investigate the effect of external R&D and R&D cooperation on 
internal R&D expenditures. Chapter 4 examines possible substitutability and 
                                                 
1 R&D survey: All business units with 50 employees or more are asked to answer the survey in all years. For units with 10-
49 employees, usually 35 % of the firms are drawn out to participate as well as units that were R&D active last survey. The 
data for 2006 and 2008 includes business units with 5 to 9 employees as well.  
The innovation survey: All business units with 50 employees or more. In addition 35 % randomly drawn firms with 5 to 49 
employees. 
2 http://www.ssb.no/foun/om.html 
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complementarity between internal R&D and external R&D expenditures, and internal R&D 
and R&D cooperation with respect to firm innovativeness. In the last section the main results 
will be discussed, summarized, and based on our findings conclusions will be drawn. 
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2. Literature: Determinants of R&D and innovation 
 
A firm can acquire knowledge and technology skills either by conducting R&D itself or 
access R&D from external sources: R&D contracting; through merging or acquisition with 
R&D active firms; and through R&D cooperation with other firms. Determining how much 
to conduct internally, and how much – and from whom – to acquire externally, has been 
frequent subject in research. In this section, we give an outline of these determinants.  
 
Mairesse and Mohnen (2010) give a brief outline of determinants of R&D. The effect of 
buying external R&D on internal R&D depends on whether the two are substitutes or 
complements. Substitutability is traditionally analyzed within the transaction cost 
framework. Complementarity became an object for R&D research first after the absorptive 
capacity was introduced as a concept. Market structure as determinant of R&D has been 
given attention in research since Schumpeter. Over the past twenty years, the effect of R&D 
spillovers and cooperation in R&D has also been given attention in the industrial 
organization economics.   
 
2.1  Theoretics of Substitutability in R&D: The Transaction 
Cost Theory 
 
The interaction between internal and external R&D was first analyzed within the framework 
of transaction cost theory. Under this approach, the choice of organizing R&D in the firm or 
buying R&D externally dependents on minimizing costs (rather than exploiting 
complementarities), which hence assumes substitutability between internal and external 
R&D
3
.  
                                                 
3 This is explicit in Coase (1937)  who defines the determinants of the size of the firm (i.e. the tradeoff between internal 
organizing or external market contracting, and hence the mere existence of the firm): “It is hoped to show in the following 
paper that a definition of a firm may be obtained which is not only realistic in that it correspond to what is meant by a firm 
in the real world, but is tractable by two of the most powerful instruments of economic analysis developed by Marshall, the 
idea of the margin and that of substitution, together giving the idea of substitution at the margin” and “at the margin, the 
cost of organizing within the firm will be equal either to the costs of organizing in another firm or to the costs involved in 
leaving the transaction to be “organized” by the price mechanism.” Coase (1937: 386, 404) 
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In the process of inventing and developing new products, Williamson (1975: 177-207) 
describes the large firm in general as inferior to the small firm, due to organizational limits 
of the large firm
4
. The large firm should acquire inventions and developments from smaller 
firms through either external assignments or vertical integration, and thereafter finish the 
products for supply. Williamson (1975:205-206) favours in general vertical integration in 
order to overcome the potential problems of opportunistic behaviour and moral hazard 
between contractor and buyer. If contracting should limit the scope of opportunistic 
behaviour, the buyer must undertake precaution in specifying and governing the contract, 
especially when the transactions of innovations involve high uncertainty, are frequent and 
involve durable investments (Williamson 1979). 
 
In a later paper, Williamson (1981) discusses the trade-off between buying external R&D in 
the market and making R&D internally, e.g. through vertical merger or acquisition. Markets 
enjoy certain advantages in both production and governance costs respects if the tradeable 
R&D is of nonspecific nature, i.e. not customized for the buyer: “Static scale economies can 
be more fully exhausted by buying instead of making; markets can also aggregate 
uncorrelated demands, thereby realizing risk-pooling benefits; and external procurement 
avoids many if the hazards to which internal procurement is subject”, the latter referring to 
bureaucratic hazards (Williamson 1981: 558). On the other hand, when the tradeable R&D 
becomes more specific, the costs of contracting and governance for the buyer increase. 
Making R&D internally instead has certain advantages over the market: “First, common 
ownership reduces the incentives to suboptimize. Second, and related, internal organization 
is able to invoke fiat to resolve differences, whereas costly adjudication is needed when an 
impasse develops between autonomous traders. Third, internal organization has easier and 
more complete access to the relevant information when dispute settling is needed” 
(Williamson 1981: 559). Hence, for a certain level of specificity in R&D, the firm is superior 
to the market in procurement of R&D.  
 
Transaction cost theory has two implications for R&D. First, the firm acquires non-specific 
R&D through external purchases and specific R&D through vertical merger or acquisition. 
                                                 
4 The organizational limits of the large firm is attributed to large organizational and conservative bureaucratic rules which 
hinders the range of response to outer circumstances and innovation; limited access to venture capital; problems of 
providing appropriate incentives for entrepreneurs within the firm; and conflicts between parallel R&D projects 
(Williamson 1975: 199-203).  
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Second, if internal R&D is found to have positive and diminishing returns to scale, the 
assumption of substitutability in internal and external R&D in transaction cost theory 
involves that buying external R&D have negative effect of the marginal product of internal 
R&D.  
 
Teece (1977) finds that enterprises which are more experienced in contracting out R&D 
experience lower technology transfer costs. He claims that international transfer of 
technology is most likely to be viable when production are of a certain scale, i.e. that it runs 
are long enough to allow for several R&D outsourcing contracts. These kinds of conclusions 
where later analyzed within the absorptive capacity framework. 
 
2.2  Theoretics of Complementarity in R&D: Absorptive 
Capacity 
 
Theory concerning absorptive capacity 
The term absorptive capacity was introduced by Cohen and Levinthal (1989, 1990). Their 
findings suggest a dual role of R&D; R&D promotes innovation as well as playing an 
intermediate role in the diffusion of technology. They define absorptive capacity as a firm’s 
ability to identify, assimilate and exploit knowledge from the environment. It relies heavily 
on the experience and knowledge accumulated in the firm, due to former operations and 
prior investments in R&D. As well as easing the learning process when conducting own 
R&D, the ability to identify and utilize technology originating outside the firm sets the 
premises for diffusion of technology and R&D cooperation. Rosenberg (1990) points out the 
ability to monitor research conducted elsewhere as an important determinant for firms 
performing basic research. Mowery and Oxley (1995) emphasize the importance of human 
capital, suggesting that absorptive capacity is the basic knowledge needed to deal with 
technology acquired outside the firm’s own technology pool, whereas Zahra & George 
(2002) extends the concept of absorptive capacity even further, dividing the capacity in to 
potential and realized absorptive capacity. The potential ACAP of a firm consists of their 
ability to acquire and assimilate new technology, whereas the realized ACAP revolves 
around their ability to transform and exploit the new information. They suggest that the 
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value created from own R&D depends on a firm’s potential and realized ACAP; the potential 
capacity increases the firm’s ability to make strategic changes and the realized capacity is 
what gives them a competitive advantage. See Zahra and George (2002) for a thorough 
review of literature and empirics concerning absorptive capacity. 
Evidence for the importance of the dual role of R&D are found both at the organizational 
level (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990, Cockburn and Henderson, 1998), the national level 
(Keller, 1996) and at the industry level (Griffith et al, 2000), suggesting that the presence of 
intramural R&D facilitates innovation and technology transfer. Cockburn and Henderson 
emphasize the importance of connections with the scientific community, stating that 
conducting basic research within the firm is not sufficient, at least not in the pharmaceutical 
industry.   
Examining the US pharmaceutical industry, Gambardella (1992) finds evidence supporting 
the importance of absorptive capacity. In his study he finds that the ability to utilize 
intramural R&D, as well as technology originating outside the firm, increases with the 
quality of the in-house R&D department. His findings suggest that diffusion of technology 
may be a better strategy than protection, promoting R&D collaboration. A successful 
innovator in his sample is not characterized by superior production of new technology per se, 
rather being part of a network where information flows between the participants.   
When addressing the technology gap between nations, Keller (1996) stresses the importance 
of absorptive capacity in the case of technology transfer following a regime change in lesser 
developed countries. Lacking absorptive capacity in the receiving country will limit the 
growth associated with the increased access to technology and information, seeing that 
accumulated human capital is crucial for the implementation phase. In order for developing 
countries to fully benefit from the technological information, the human capital must 
accumulate at a higher rate than before the regime change.  
Arora and Gambardella (1994) split the absorptive capacity in to two dimensions; ability to 
evaluate and the ability to utilize. The ability to utilize raises the number of innovation 
ventures. Firms with greater ability to evaluate are more selective and focus on fewer but 
more valuable linkages.  
 
 18 
Empirics 
In recent years a growing interest in possible complementarities in innovation strategies has 
arisen. Complementarity in innovation strategies suggest that synergy effects may exist for 
firms pursuing different R&D practices, i.e. implementing one of the practices yields higher 
marginal returns for the other and vice versa. If such a relationship exists this is in contrast 
with earlier literature promoting substitutability between internal R&D and R&D acquired 
outside the firm, theoretically anchored in transaction cost theory as described earlier. Two 
forms of complementarity are relevant for this paper; a) complementarity between internal 
R&D and various forms of R&D cooperation and b) complementarity between internal R&D 
and contracted R&D. Literature concerning complementarity between product and process 
innovation exist as well, e.g. Miravete and Parnias (2006). However, we don’t differentiate 
between the two innovation strategies in our thesis and will not discuss this matter in depth. 
Several econometric approaches are used to unveil possible complementarity. A combination 
of the adoption approach and the production approach is most commonly used, at least in the 
earliest work in the area (e.g. Arora and Gambardella, 1990; Cassiman and Veugelers, 
2002a). The adoption approach checks for conditional correlation between the residuals of 
reduced form regressions of the different strategies and observed exogenous variables 
(Lokshin et al., 2007). The production approach uses the concept of supermodularity to 
directly test for complementarity. Different methods for testing for complementarity, and an 
overview of previous literature, are thoroughly described in Athey and Stern (1998). In later 
years as the availability of longitudinal data has increased dynamic panel data methods are 
used as well (e.g. Lokshin et al., 2008; Bergman, 2011).  
The empirical support for complementarity is ambiguous, seeing that different R&D 
strategies are found to be both complementary and substitutes. Assessing four different 
strategies of external linkages in the biotechnology industry, Arora and Gambardella (1990) 
find complementarity in all cases. Veugelers (1997) finds support for complementarity 
between in-house and external R&D, given that the firms have an internal R&D department, 
underlining the need for absorptive capacity. Belderbos et al. (2008a) finds complementarity 
for affiliate R&D and intra-firm technology transfer from parent firm for Japanese firms. 
Assessing the effects of FDI in India after the reform in 1991, Sasidharan and Kathuria 
(2011) find that a firm’s decision whether to engage in intramural R&D or not are 
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complementary to the inflow of FDI. However, in the case of majority equity ownership they 
found substitutability.   
Belderbos et al. (2006) examines which effects engaging in simultaneous cooperation 
strategies have on a firm’s productivity, being the first paper who addresses possible 
complementarity between different R&D cooperation. Their results find support for both 
complementarity and substitutability between the different strategies. For large firms a 
strategy involving cooperation with competitors and customers turn out to be 
complementary. Examining the small firms in the sample cooperation with customers and 
suppliers are the only cooperation strategy that passes the test for complementarity. 
Cooperation with competitors and universities turn out to be substitutes independent of firm 
size, whereas cooperation with customers and suppliers, and suppliers and universities are 
substitutes only for small firms.  
Hagedoorn and Wang (2010) explore under which conditions internal and external R&D 
strategies turn out to be substitutes or complementary. In their study they find that as 
investments in in-house R&D increases the R&D strategies are complementary, whereas 
lower levels of in-house R&D investments provides support for substitutability. The 
presence of complementarity, conditional on significantly high investments in intramural 
R&D are found by Belderbos et al. (2008a) as well.     
Assessing the effects of FDI in India after the reform in 1991, Sasidharan and Kathuria 
(2011) find that a firm’s decision whether to engage in intramural R&D or not are 
complementary to the inflow of FDI. However, in the case of majority equity ownership they 
found substitutability.   
Schmiedeberg (2008) find weak evidence for complementarity between contracted R&D and 
in-house R&D. Evidence for complementarity between R&D cooperation and in-house R&D 
are found when the probability of patenting are used as dependent variable. However, when 
percentage of sales due to new products is dependent variable she finds no evidence of 
complementarity, which is similar to previous empirical work using new sales attributable to 
new products as dependent variable as well(e.g. Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002b; Love and 
Roper, 2001). Using comparable data to Cassiman and Veugelers (2006) she reaches 
different conclusions regarding internal and external R&D, which in itself is surprising. 
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However, she attributes the differing results to country-specific affecting the innovative 
behavior of the firms.  
Recent work by Karin Bergman (2011) found weak evidence for complementarity analyzing 
a panel of Swedish manufacturing firms. However, her results showed that whether 
complementarity or substitutability is found are industry-sensitive. This is in line with the 
literature examined for this thesis, seeing that small changes in samples or models lead to 
different conclusions for tests of complementarity. She also provides an overview of recent 
empirical work concerning complementarity.   
 
2.3  R&D, innovation and market structure: Theoretics and 
empirics  
 
The literature on market structure and R&D has not returned any unique verdict on the 
relationship between the two. The Schumpetarian view that market competition does not 
provide optimal investments in R&D, and hence the optimal provision of innovation,
5
 has 
been proved, rejected and modified. Arrow (1962) shows that the monopolist always has less 
incentive to innovate than competing firms, since the total gain of a given cost reduction per 
unit is less under monopoly than under competition. However, Arrow assumes that under 
monopoly only the monopolist itself can invent. Reinganum (1983) models a situation where 
a monopolist faces possible entrants, and assumes that both the monopolist and the entrants 
can engage in a given R&D project which gives considerable market power post innovation 
if proven successful, but that the success of the project is uncertain. She shows that the 
incumbent firm invests more in R&D in the presence of challengers, but less than the 
challengers. In an earlier article, Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) also emphasise the effect of 
competition in R&D on the level of R&D conducted. They show that under both initial 
                                                 
5 When Schumpeter (1947) discusses the importance of studying the capitalistic economy as an evolving process, where the 
characteristics and qualities of the whole process, and not of the economy in any particular state in time, should be 
concerned, he states: “A system – any system, economic or other – that at every given point of time fully utilizes its 
possibilities to the best advantage may yet in the long run be inferior to a system that does so at no given point of time, 
because the latter’s failure to do so may be a condition for the level of speed of lung-run performance.” (Schumpeter 1947: 
83) 
 21 
competition and initial monopoly in the product market, competition in R&D increases the 
level of R&D conducted in each firm. Further, each firm tries to outperform the other firms 
by conducting more and more R&D, leading to an excessive level of R&D expenditure in 
equilibrium. Concerning these findings, it is not the degree of competition in the market of 
present products, but the market of future products, that affects the level of R&D; it is not 
price and quality competition on existing products, but rather competition in introducing new 
products that matters
6
.   
 
Empirically, the threat of losing market power has been proven a motive for conducting 
more R&D in the presence of entrant challengers in a study of British manufacturing firms 
by Blundell et al. (1999). They also find that market share is positively related to innovation. 
Performing continuous R&D is also found to be important (Mairesse and Mohnen, 2010).  
 
The presence of R&D spillovers also affects the level of R&D conducted. As will be 
emphasized in the literature section on cooperation, R&D spillovers have negative impact on 
the level of R&D conducted. This effect is increasing in the degree of spillovers and the 
number of competitors; a firm will limit the leakage of R&D to its competitors by simply 
reducing R&D. On the other hand, in the absence of spillovers, Sah and Stiglitz (1987) show 
that the total level of R&D conducted is invariant to the number of competing firms in the 
industry. This naturally involves that the change in R&D conducted per firm is negatively 
proportional to the number of firms in the industry. A further overview of the literature on 
market structure, R&D and innovation is given by e.g. Kamien and Schwartz (1975) and van 
Cayseele (1998). 
 
2.4 R&D, innovation and M&A: Empirics  
 
Regarding the effect of international M&A, it is not the multinationality that affects the level 
of conducted R&D per se; it is rather the changes in the conditions of conducting R&D pre- 
                                                 
6 a parallel to Schumpeter (1947: 84): “… in capitalist reality as distinguished from its textbook picture, it is not that kind of 
[price] competition which counts, but the competition from the new commodity, the new technology, the new source of 
supply, the new type of organization – competition which commands a decisive cost or quality advantage and which strikes 
not at the margins of the profits and the outputs of the existing firms, but at their foundations and their very lives.” 
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and post-M&A that makes the difference. Research on the effect of M&A on R&D and 
innovation has largely been analyzed within the theoretical frameworks presented in this 
literature section: M&A may generate scale and scope economies in R&D, and create 
synergies in R&D in the new firm in the case of complementarity in R&D; M&A may 
reduce competition which again may impact R&D and innovation decisions; and in the case 
of substitutability in R&D between the two former firms, R&D may be concentrated in the 
most R&D efficient firm (Bertrand, 2009). In this section, we therefore only present 
empirical results on the effect of M&A on R&D. 
 
Regarding the growth in Japanese foreign investment in the United States in the early 
1990’s, Kogut and Chang (1991) find that Japanese foreign investments are more likely to 
occur in U.S. industries with intensive R&D expenditures, and that the likelihood decreases 
as R&D intensity grows in Japanese industries. They suggest that Japanese foreign direct 
investment in R&D intensive industries are motivated by acquisition of technology and 
knowledge. In a later study of 32 Japanese and American companies, Kuemmerle (1999) 
comes to a similar conclusion in an examination of factors determining whether firms seek to 
augment, as the opposite to exploit, the knowledge stock of their foreign affiliates. He finds 
that the propensity to make R&D augmenting investment in an affiliate abroad rises with the 
quality of the human resource pool in the industry of the foreign affiliate, as well as with the 
R&D intensity in the home country of the affiliate. Firms are less likely to invest in 
augmenting R&D, and hence more likely to invest in exploiting R&D, as the relative 
attractiveness of the country market, measured as GNP in foreign country relative to GNP in 
home country, increases. Hence, these firms are motivated by utilizing R&D spillovers in 
foreign countries and as the quality of these spillovers increase, these firms are more likely 
to invest in R&D augmentation abroad.  
 
With respect to the industrial organization literature, Ekholm and Hakkala (2007) analyze 
the impact of R&D spillovers on R&D and production localization in a two-country (one 
small and one large country), two-factor (unskilled and skilled labour) and two-good model. 
The unskilled workers produce a homogenous good, while the high skilled workers are 
engaged in R&D and produce a differentiated high-tech good. In the case of large spillovers 
in R&D, the equilibrium outcome of the model is when the firm locates production of the 
differentiated high-tech good, including the R&D activity, in the smallest country. This is 
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because there are fewer high skilled workers able to absorb the spillovers in the smallest 
country.  
 
After the wave of M&A and leverage buy-outs (LBOs) in the 1980’s, several studies on the 
effects of M&A and LBOs were carried out. Lei and Hitt (1995) argue that M&A and LBOs 
bring along complex changes within the firm which make external knowledge sourcing 
attractive relative to internal R&D activity. Prolonged R&D outsourcing reduces the base of 
human capital and skills, i.e. its absorptive capacity, and hence its ability to utilize new 
knowledge and technologies, reducing its competitiveness on the long run. 
 
Gupta and Govindarajan (2000) find that acquired subsidiaries have higher knowledge 
inflows from parent corporations than greenfield subsidiaries, and attribute the difference to 
higher absorptive capacity in acquired subsidiaries. On the contrary, they do not find any 
significant difference between acquired and greenfield subsidiaries in knowledge outflows to 
parent corporations. The results suggest that a subsidiary’s absorptive capacity only 
increases its disposition to acquire, and not disperse, knowledge. 
 
In a study of cross-border and domestic M&A in OECD-countries between 1990 and 1999, 
Bertrand and Zuniga (2006) find that outward cross-border M&A had a positive effect on 
R&D expenditures, while inward cross-border M&A and domestic M&A had a negative 
effect. The results are valid across high, medium and low-technology industries. They 
suggest that domestic M&A partners do not seem to be looking for R&D efficiency as a 
motive for M&A, while domestic firms, on the other hand, seek to exploit complementarity 
in R&D with foreign M&A partners. Their results may also indicate substitutability in 
internal and external R&D between domestic M&A partners. 
 
Regarding geographical limitations of access knowledge and technology through spillovers, 
some studies have examined foreign direct investment as a strategy for easier access. Griffith 
et al. (2006) examines the impact of spillovers acquired by UK firm inventors located in US 
and UK respectively. Productivity gains due to these spillovers were significantly higher for 
inventors located in the US than UK inventors. The authors attribute the difference to the 
larger size of the US, relative to the UK, R&D stock, and suggest that firms should locate 
more inventors in the US in order to access larger R&D spillovers. Keller (2002) finds 
evidence for geographical limits of R&D spillovers. In a sample of OECD countries between 
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1970 and 1995, he finds that foreign spillovers are declining in distance to a major 
technology-producing country
7
. In a more limited sample of Japanese and U.S. firms, 
Branstetter (2001) comes to a similar conclusion. He finds that knowledge spillovers are of 
an intranational, rather than international, character for these geographically isolated 
developed countries. 
 
Addressing the fear of knowledge sourcing of domestic target firms by a foreign acquirer, 
Bertrand et al. (2008) show that, in a theoretical oligopoly model, foreign acquirers must 
increase R&D investment in target firm post acquisition. Rival firms will increase R&D 
investment post acquisition and outdo the target firm unless its R&D is expanded. For target 
firm, some studies find a positive effect of acquisition on R&D activity. Bandick, Görg and 
Karpaty (2010) find that R&D expenditures increase after a foreign takeover in a study of 
Swedish firms. Sadowski and Sadowski-Rasters (2006) reach a similar conclusion. In a 
study of Dutch manufacturing firms, they find that foreign subsidiaries have higher 
innovation activity, and are more likely to develop new products than domestic firms. 
However, in a study of German firms, Stiebale and Reize (2008) estimate a lower propensity 
to perform innovation activities and reduced level of R&D expenditures among firms 
acquired by foreign enterprises. Bertrand (2009) finds, on the other hand, that the acquisition 
of French firms by foreign enterprises increases internal and external R&D, and also the 
propensity to collaborate in R&D with external partners.  
 
Ito and Wakasugi (2007) examine the R&D activities in Japanese overseas subsidiaries. 
They find that subsidiaries in countries with high frequency of high-skilled labour force 
(measured as the ratio of researchers to the whole population) drive the parent company to 
increase the R&D activity in the subsidiary. Erken and Kleijn (2010) reach the same 
conclusion in a large panel of OECD-countries between 1990 and 2004. Shimizutani and 
Todo (2008), also studying determinants of foreign R&D investment in Japanese overseas 
subsidiaries, differentiate between basic R&D and R&D aimed at development/design at the 
subsidiary. They find that basic R&D activity in subsidiary is increasing in the ratio of R&D 
to GNP in subsidiary country. No relationship between R&D aimed at development/design 
and R&D level in subsidiary country is found. The authors suggest that subsidiaries increase 
                                                 
7 These are France, Germany, Japan, U.K. and U.S. 
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their absorptive capacity in countries with high R&D activity, in order to gain from 
spillovers. R&D aimed at development/design is found to be positively dependent on the 
R&D intensity (R&D to sales ratio) of the parent.  
 
For the acquirer, the effect on own internal R&D is ambiguous. Desai, Foley and Hines 
(2008) find that foreign investment that is triggered by foreign economic growth is 
associated with growing capital accumulation, employment compensation, R&D, and 
exports in home firm. Todo and Shimizutani (2008) find that overseas R&D expenditures 
aimed at the utilization and acquisition of foreign advanced knowledge have a positive 
impact on the productivity growth of the parent firm, in a study of Japanese multinational 
enterprises. However, they find no evidence of increased marginal effect of internal R&D on 
productivity growth due to the overseas subsidiaries’ R&D, and suggest that overseas R&D 
is a substitute rather than complement. Hamida and Piscitello (2010) also find a positive 
impact of R&D investment in subsidiaries on parent productivity growth among Swiss 
multinationals.  
 
Firms may access technology and knowledge from other externals. Cruscuolo, Haskel and 
Slaughter (2005) find that multinational firms tend to exhibit higher productivity than their 
purely domestic counterparts. They attribute much of the difference to the fact that 
multinationals acquire more knowledge from external partners; it is not only that they are 
multinational that makes these firms more innovative per se. Collaboration with suppliers, 
customers, universities and own enterprise contribute to a large part of the innovation 
difference. 
 
Examining acquisition motives of high tech companies in the electronic design automation, 
biotech and semiconductor industry, Wagner (2007) finds that, except for the biotech 
industry, R&D intensity of the acquirer is insignificantly associated with numbers of 
acquisitions. He suggests that these companies do not seek to substitute away R&D from 
itself to the target firm. Rather, high financial leverage (total assets to equity) and high sales 
seem to be conditions for acquisition in these industries. For the biotech industry, Wagner 
finds weak evidence for a negative relationship between R&D intensity of the acquirer and 
number of acquisitions, indicating a motive for R&D substitution. 
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Analyzing R&D localization decisions, Belderbos et al. (2008b) set up a two-country model 
with two competing firms, one technology leader and one technology laggard, with 
headquarters located in one country and a subsidiary in the other country. Assuming that 
spillovers do not cross borders, increased spillovers reduce R&D activity in the subsidiary of 
the technology leader. The efficiency of technology transfer between parent company and 
subsidiary is positively related to concentration of R&D in the headquarter country. The 
efficiency of technology transfer is associated with high absorptive capacity, indicating that 
higher absorptive capacity of a subsidiary reduce the subsidiary’s share of R&D activity of 
the enterprise. In the case of strong technological leadership, increased product market 
competition induces the leader to increase R&D abroad, in order to capture market share.    
 
2.5 Cooperation in R&D: Theoretics and empirics 
 
Veugelers (1998:2) summarizes motives and problems of R&D allying: Sharing of costs and 
risks; access to the partners’ know-how; utilization of potential economies of scale in R&D; 
utilization of synergies between internal and external R&D; monitoring of R&D activities of 
the competitors and influence competition; access to public subsidies, and influence 
industrial, trade or competition policy as potential motives. Potential problems are: start-up 
investments; coordination and agency costs of running the cooperation; asymmetric 
information; and lack of ability to control information flows between partners. 
 
In our consideration of the nature of R&D cooperation, we follow Belderbos et al. (2004a) 
and differentiate three types of cooperation partners: (i) horizontal cooperation, involving 
cooperation with competitors on the output market; (ii) vertical cooperation, involving 
cooperation with suppliers or customers; and (iii) institutional cooperation, involving 
cooperation with independent research institutions and universities.  
 
Horizontal cooperation 
Cooperation between competitors has been analyzed under the framework of Industrial 
Organization Theory (IO). IO models compare scenarios of R&D cooperation with scenarios 
of R&D competition. In these multiple-stage models, firms typically first decide whether or 
not to participate in a cooperative R&D agreement, the firms then decide the level of R&D 
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activity and – finally – output in the product market is chosen. The models assume that R&D 
leads to a reduction in unit costs of production. In these models, the implication of horizontal 
R&D cooperation on the level of R&D conducted and on final output depends on initial 
market structure and the level of initial spillovers from R&D. 
 
Katz (1986) shows that, in a model where several firms interact, horizontal R&D 
cooperation favours the level of R&D conducted if the firms operate in independent product 
markets, if their products are imperfect substitutes, or if there is R&D spillovers in the 
absence of cooperation. Under initially restricted R&D spillovers and high degree of product 
market competition, the model predicts that firms find it in their collective interest to use a 
cooperative agreement to restrict the level of R&D conducted. 
 
Modelling a Cournot duopoly, D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) show that the level of 
total R&D will be higher under R&D cooperation compared to non-cooperation. The 
difference is attributed to internalization of R&D externalities, i.e. spillovers. The difference 
is even found to be greater if the firms also collude in output given a certain level of 
spillovers, which is explained by the firms’ ability to capture more of the surplus created by 
their research and hence make more R&D under absence of competition. De Bondt and 
Veugelers (1991) refine the model, and show that above a certain level of spillovers, 
coordination of R&D between two firms with differentiated substitutes result in more R&D 
investments compared to a non-coordination situation. If the spillovers are too small, or if 
the products are complements rather than substitutes, the effect of R&D cooperation on 
R&D investment is negative. This is also consistent with Atallah (2002). Kamien et al 
(1992) extend the model by D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) by including several firms 
(i.e. opening for the possibility of both duopoly and oligopoly) and heterogeneity in 
products. Their model predicts that R&D activity is negatively related to spillovers within an 
R&D cooperative if (i) the firms compete with homogeneous products and spillovers are 
small initially or (ii) the products are heterogeneous and spillovers are large initially. When 
the products are homogeneous, a firm benefits from cost reduction by increasing their own 
profit at the expense of its competitors
8
. When spillovers within the cooperative are below a 
certain level, the R&D efforts of the firm will induce a larger unit cost reduction for the firm 
                                                 
8 Cf. the implications of a unit cost reduction for one firm in a Cournot duopoly. 
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relative to its competitors, resulting in increasing profits for the firm. If spillovers increase, 
the incentive to conduct R&D reduces as the competitors increase their unit costs reduction 
relative to the firm. The incentive to cooperate also weakens. As for heterogeneous products, 
a unit cost reduction for one firm increases profits for all firms
9
. But, if spillovers become 
sufficiently high, the unit costs of the less and most cost efficient firms converge. A further 
increase in spillovers within the cooperative, reduce the profits for the most cost efficient 
firms, and hence reducing their incentive to conduct R&D and collaborate in R&D. The 
theoretical predictions are largely supported by Kaiser (2002) in an empirical study 
considering cooperation between firms in the German service sector. 
 
Vertical cooperation 
In the context of transaction cost theory, Pisano (1990) and Teece (1992) describes vertical 
cooperation as a hybrid between hierarchical and market transactions, superior to both 
hierarchical organization and markets if R&D can be effectively governed by contracts. In 
transaction cost theory, cost reduction has been seen as a major motive for vertical 
cooperation (Belderbos et al. 2004a). 
 
Within the IO literature, Atallah (2002) models two firms competing in the output market 
with two symmetric suppliers, and predicts a higher level of conducted R&D under a vertical 
cooperation scenario than under a non-cooperation scenario, independent of the level of 
spillovers. Japanese vertical keiretsus have been frequent objects for research on vertical 
cooperation and spillovers. In studies of the Japanese automobile industry, both Kawasaki 
and McMillan (1987), and Asanuma and Kikutani (1992) found that subcontracting through 
vertical Keiretsu significantly reduced the risk of suppliers as the risk was shared with the 
manufacturer. Suzuki (1993) finds significant spillovers in the Japanese electrical machinery 
industry within the vertical Keiretsu, but also between competing vertical Keiretsus, though 
these are smaller. Branstetter (2000) reach similar conclusions using a larger sample of 
Japanese keiretsus. Spillovers are found to increase the rate of return of R&D, but the effect 
of cooperation on the level of R&D is not a subject of the studies. Nevertheless, increased 
rate of return should, for a given level of R&D unit cost, increase the optimum level of 
R&D. The risk reduction results of these studies must be seen in the context of the Keiretsus, 
                                                 
9 Cf. the implications of a unit cost reduction for one firm in a Bertrand duopoly. 
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which by nature are more permanent than other vertical cooperatives, and hence reduces the 
small-number-bargaining problem described by e.g. Williamson (1975:26-30).  
 
In a study of German firms, Kaiser (2002) finds no significant relationship between 
spillovers and the propensity to form vertical R&D cooperatives. However, Cassiman and 
Veugelers (2002b) analyse the impact of incoming spillovers and appropriability on the 
propensity to enter into R&D cooperation with customers and suppliers, and research 
institutes respectively. They find that firms which experience high incoming spillovers and 
find the public available pool of knowledge of great importance, are less likely to cooperate 
with suppliers or competitors. Lack of appropriability affects the propensity to enter into a 
vertical R&D cooperative negatively. The authors suggest that this is due to the fear of 
leaking strategic information and knowledge to competitors via customers or suppliers. 
López (2008), examining Spanish firms, reaches the same conclusion, who also states that 
cost reduction is a motive of entering into vertical R&D collaboration. 
 
Belderbos et al. (2004b) find, in a study of Dutch innovating firms, that both temporary and 
persistent R&D cooperation with competitors have a positive impact on labour productivity, 
and that persistent cooperation positively impact novel sales.  
 
Linking customer cooperation to demand-push theories, von Hippel (1988:102-115) suggests 
cooperation with lead users to determine the user needs for new products and services in 
rapidly changing markets. Tether (2002) draws the same conclusions. Though, Belderbos et 
al. (2004b) estimate an insignificant, yet positive, marginal effect of customer cooperation 
on growth of novel sales. The advantages of customer cooperation in general are discussed 
in detail in Shaw (1994).  
 
Institutional cooperation 
Industry-university cooperatives and research thereof was intensified in the 1990’s 
(Hagedoorn et al. 2000; Hall et al. 2003). In general, cooperation with universities are seen 
as a useful way of acquiring technology and knowledge which require sorts of research that 
many firms regard as excessively expensive to undertake alone (Tether 2002). Such 
cooperation is found especially beneficially when coupled with public funding (Belderbos et 
al. 2004a). Cassiman and Veugelers (2002b) find that firms which experience high incoming 
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spillovers and find the public available pool of knowledge of great importance, are more 
likely to cooperate with universities and independent research institutions. The propensity to 
cooperate with research institutes is increasing with lack of appropriability. Their results are 
supported by Belderbos et al. (2004a) and López (2008).  
 
From a resource-based perspective, Miotti and Sachwald (2003) analyse the propensity to 
cooperate in R&D. They find that firms operating on “the technological frontier” and, hence, 
are more dependent on new science, have higher probability to cooperate with universities. 
Mohnen and Hoareau (2003) draw a somewhat different conclusion in a study of French, 
German, Irish and Spanish firms: R&D intensive and radically innovating firms tend not to 
cooperate directly or formally with universities and government research institutions, but 
rather source knowledge from them through spillovers. Monjon and Waelbroeck (2003) may 
provide explanations of these results. In a study of French manufacturers, they find that for 
highly innovative firms, which are at the frontier of the domestic academic knowledge in 
their industry and have state-of-the-art research department, cooperation with universities 
outside France, and not with French universities, increase the probability of innovating: 
“They only marginally benefit from aggregate (or industry-wide) spillovers from domestic 
universities. They need new forms of academic knowledge that they acquire through formal 
cooperation with foreign universities” Monjon and Waelbroeck (2003: 1267). The authors 
find that less innovative firm, increases the likelihood of innovation by cooperating with 
domestic universities, and suggest that these firms use universities as a source of acquiring 
and catch up the state-of-the-art knowledge. Addressing the risk of cooperation failures in a 
study of almost the same sample of French manufacturers, L’Huillery and Pfister (2009) find 
that R&D collaboration with foreign universities are especially prone of failures. However, 
the probability of failure is lower for large firms and subsidiaries, and firms which have 
experience in R&D collaboration.  
 
Hagedorn et al. (2000: 579) refer to Cockburn and Henderson (1997), who show the 
importance of ties with universities for innovative pharmaceutical firms, and propose that 
research ties with universities increase the absorptive capacity as defined by Cohen and 
Levinthal (1989). Belderbos et al (2004a) find a similar relationship, but with the reverse 
interpretation: R&D intensive firms are more likely to cooperate with universities and 
research institutions.   
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Within the economics of agglomeration, geographical location is of strategic importance 
(Porter 1990:148-159). Locating the firm near a university is also described as an advantage: 
“Universities located near a group of competitors will be most likely to notice the industry, 
perceive it important, and respond accordingly. In turn, competitors are more likely to fund 
and support local university activity. (…) Geographical concentration of an industry acts as a 
strong magnet to attract talented people and other factors to it.” (Porter 1990: 157). In certain 
geographical areas, spillovers from research institutions, suppliers, customers and 
competitors are large. An example of the first is the “Research Triangle” in Piedmont, North 
Carolina
10
.  
 
Consultants make up another institution for acquiring technology and knowledge. Tether 
(2002: 953) refers to Bruce and Morris (1998), who argue that external consultants are more 
likely to provide new, innovative ideas than internals, because the latter is bounded by 
internal traditions and habits. In the innovation process, Bessant and Hush (1995: 101-102) 
see consultants as more than a provider of specialised, expert knowledge; the consultants 
also help users to understand and prioritize problems and needs for innovation; consultants 
working with several users have the advantage of sharing experiences and knowledge 
between users, and also act as a “ ’marriage broker’, providing users with a single point of 
contact through which to access a wide range of specialist services”. 
  
                                                 
10 The area has a high concentration of high-tech companies within i.a. pharmaceutcals, biotechnology, nanotechnology and 
informatics, as well as several universities: i.a. North Carolina University, Duke University and University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill (Research Triangle Region, 2011). 
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3. The effect of external R&D sources on internal 
R&D  
3.1 Introduction 
In this section we explore the impact of acquiring external R&D on internal R&D activity. 
External R&D sources take three forms: R&D contracting; through merging or acquisition 
with R&D active firms; and through R&D cooperation with other firms. Regarding M&A as 
an R&D source, a pure transfer of R&D between a Norwegian firm and another firm within 
the same enterprise must be accounted as R&D expenditures and R&D revenues
11
. As for 
R&D collaboration, we assume that each firm accounts collaboration costs as internal R&D 
expenditures. Hence, acquiring R&D through M&A appears as either external R&D 
expenditures (similar to R&D contracting) or R&D cooperation.  
Following the transaction cost theory, external and internal R&D are substitutes, and one 
should expect external R&D purchases to negatively impact internal R&D expenditures. 
Regarding the theories of absorptive capacity, internal R&D activity is necessary for 
utilization of external R&D. Hence, both external R&D purchases, but also R&D 
cooperation, demand at least a certain level of internal R&D, and are expected to be 
positively associated with internal R&D expenditures. Besides the need of absorptive 
capacity, R&D cooperation is expected to affect internal R&D activity in several ways. R&D 
cooperation with competitors internalizes spillovers, and increases in general the incentives 
to perform R&D. Though, under certain market conditions and level of spillovers this effect 
is not found (cf. section 2.5 on R&D cooperation in the literature section). Vertical R&D 
cooperation is found to increase cost efficiency and provide first-hand customer information, 
both giving incentives to increase internal R&D. Institutional R&D cooperation is thought to 
give, at least the less productive firms, access to the newest technology and knowledge. This 
effect might positively affect internal R&D, in accordance with absorptive capacity and 
                                                 
11
 Internal transfer of R&D between two firms within the same enterprise should be entered in accordance with 
transfer pricing principle described in Lov 1999 nr. 14 § 13-1, if both firms are Norwegain, and in Lov 1999 nr. 
14 § 13-1 (4) and “Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations” by 
OECD (2010) if a Norwegian firm buys R&D from a foreign firm within the same enterprise. The usual 
procedure is pricing in accordance with the arm’s length principle. 
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complementarity theories, or negatively affect internal R&D, in accordance with transaction 
cost and substitutability theory. As described in the literature section, changes in the market 
structure post M&A between two competitors might affect the incentives for performing 
R&D. Whether the effect is positive or negative is not clear. R&D purchases from foreign 
firms within the same enterprise might then be affected by changes in market structure for 
newly merged or acquired firms which start purchasing R&D internally in the enterprise. 
With the data available, we are not able to control for this effect.  
Figure 3.1 – Internal R&D expenditures in Bn. 2009 NOK  
 
Source: R&D and innovation surveys, Statistics Norway. External multinational refers to R&D expenditures 
from foreign firms within the same enterprise. The survey covers all Norwegian firms with more than 50 
employees and a sample of firms with 10-49 employees. Aggregation based on weights provided by Statistics 
Norway. Deflation in accordance with price indices for R&D from “Indikatorrapporten”.   
 
Figure 3.1 shows aggregated investments in intramural R&D following three different R&D 
strategies for R&D active firms. Firms that rely solely on conducting in-house R&D have 
lower investments in intramural R&D than those who acquire R&D outside the firm. Internal 
R&D expenditures have increased throughout the decade for firms with multinational R&D 
ties. Investments carried out by firms that buy R&D or engage in R&D cooperation outside 
the enterprise are approximately on the same level in 2009 as in 1997. This may indicate that 
investments in internal R&D are indeed stimulated by investments in external R&D, in line 
with the notion of absorptive capacity. 
Looking at firms with respect to firm size we see from figure 3.2 that large firms invest more 
in intramural R&D than smaller firms, constituting roughly 50 % of aggregated internal 
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R&D investments in 2009. However, the small and medium sized firms have increased their 
investments throughout the decade and represent a significantly larger proportion of 
aggregated internal R&D in 2009. Examining firms classified as manufacturing firms and 
service firms we find a similar pattern, with service firms closing the gap throughout the 
decade.  
Figure 3.2: Internal R&D expenditures. Bn. 2009 NOK.  
 
Source: R&D and innovation surveys, Statistics Norway. External multinational refers to R&D expenditures 
from foreign firms within the same enterprise. The survey covers all Norwegian firms with more than 50 
employees and a sample of firms with 10-49 employees. Aggregation based on weights provided by Statistics 
Norway. Deflation in accordance with price indices for R&D from “Indikatorrapporten”. Small firms have less 
than 50 employees, medium up to 249, and large firms more than 250 employees.  
 
Figure 3.3: Internal R&D expenditures. Bn. 2009 NOK. 
 
Source: R&D and innovation surveys, Statistics Norway. External multinational refers to R&D expenditures 
from foreign firms within the same enterprise. The survey covers all Norwegian firms with more than 50 
employees and a sample of firms with 10-49 employees. Aggregation based on weights provided by Statistics 
Norway. Deflation in accordance with price indices for R&D from “Indikatorrapporten”. 
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Seeing that large firms and firms from the manufacturing sector performs more in-house 
R&D than the rest we expect them to have a higher representation when it comes to 
engagement in R&D cooperation as well as contracting out R&D, in line with our findings in 
figure 3.1. From figure 3.4 we see that large firms and manufacturing firms indeed have a 
higher frequency of R&D cooperation. In all subsamples we see a trend of lower frequencies 
of cooperation throughout the decade. 
 
Figure 3.4: Frequency of R&D cooperation. R&D active firms. 
 
Source: R&D and innovation surveys, Statistics Norway. External multinational refers to R&D expenditures 
from foreign firms within the same enterprise. The survey covers all Norwegian firms with more than 50 
employees and a sample of firms with 10-49 employees. Aggregation based on weights provided by Statistics 
Norway. Deflation in accordance with price indices for R&D from “Indikatorrapporten”. Small firms have less 
than 50 employees, medium up to 249, and large firms more than 250 employees. Manufacturing firms are 
defined as all firms with NACE-codes up to 50. Service firms are defined as all other firms with NACE-codes 
starting at 50.   
 
Internal R&D expenditures were relatively stable the first half of the decade. This was 
accompanied by a decrease in the amount of external R&D bought outside the firm. 
Following the period with little or no growth in internal R&D spending, expenditures 
increased significantly, peaking in 2008. The growth period were accompanied by an 
increase in R&D bought outside the firm.  
In section 3.4 we examine the effect different strategies for acquiring R&D have on internal 
R&D. In the introduction for this thesis we find that firms acquiring R&D through 
multinational ties within the enterprise have much higher average internal R&D 
expenditures. On that note we will pay special attention to R&D strategies involving 
multinational R&D ties.   
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3.2 Data  
Variable construction 
When constructing the explanatory variables concerning cooperation we have used the vast 
amount of cooperation dummies in our set. In all the years of our set, except 2002, a section 
concerning cooperation in R&D or innovation has been included. We are therefore able to 
identify firms engaging in some sort of co-op. The dummy for cooperation, COit, takes the 
value of 1 if the firm claims to have any sort of cooperation, and 0 otherwise. The dummy 
indicating R&D cooperation with foreign firms in same enterprise, MCOit, is constructed in 
a similar fashion as the dummy indicating cooperation at any level, the difference being that 
we restrict the cooperation to foreign firms in same enterprise in regions or countries outside 
of Norway. For the final estimation of our model we create a set of dummy variables used to 
reveal whether the significance of multinational cooperation diminishes when we control for 
other forms of cooperation. We construct variables reflecting horizontal cooperation (HCO), 
vertical cooperation (VCO), domestic cooperation within enterprise (DCO) and cooperation 
with independent research institutions (ICO). Horizontal cooperation is defined as 
cooperation with competitors at home or abroad. Vertical cooperation considers all 
cooperation attributed to suppliers or customers. For the independent research institutions we 
include all institutions, both private and public. This means that universities, private research 
labs, consultancy firms, science institutions etc. are accounted for. For more details on the 
construction of the variables please turn to appendix 1.  
R&D expenditures are deflated according to the price indices for R&D costs from 
“Indikatorrapporten” (Forskningsrådet, 2010), base year 2009. 
List of variables used in our calculations are to be found in Appendix A. In the variable list 
we have included a column called transitions where we have identified the number of 
transitions from 0 to 1 or vice versa for the cooperation dummies within the firms.  
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3.3 Model specification 
A first test to check for the need of absorptive capacity including possible complementarity 
between internal R&D and external R&D activities would be to estimate the effect of 
external R&D activities on internal R&D. The absorptive capacity theory presumes the need 
for internal R&D when contracting R&D externally or cooperating in R&D. One should 
therefore assume internal R&D to be positively related to external R&D activities. Also, 
complementarity should lead to an increase in internal R&D, while substitutability should 
lead to a reduction.  
The focus of this chapter is limited to the effect of external R&D activities on internal R&D. 
In order to reveal complementarity or substitutability between internal R&D and external 
R&D activities one must consider both as inputs, and regress both on innovation output. This 
is subject for chapter 4.  
We expect external R&D to be endogenous with respect to internal R&D. Whether or not 
external R&D sourcing actually affects internal R&D, there may be other sources affecting 
both internal and external R&D simultaneously, making external R&D sourcing endogenous 
in estimation. If external R&D sourcing is endogenous, the estimated relationship between 
external R&D sources and internal R&D will be biased. Firms optimizing R&D investment 
strengthens this endogeneity problem: One should not expect the data sample to consist of 
random observations of internal and external R&D; to a lesser or greater extent firms take 
into account factors within and outside the firm when deciding the level of R&D 
investments. Market structure, R&D spillovers, demand side and supply side factors etc. 
may simultaneously affect the choice of entering R&D cooperation, the level of external 
R&D sourcing, as well as the level of internal R&D investments. An example may clarify: A 
monopolist has lower incentives to conduct R&D, both internally and externally, than 
competing firms (Arrow, 1962), and by nature no possibility to enter a horizontal R&D 
cooperative. Observations of low internal R&D together with low external R&D investment 
and no R&D cooperation investment among monopolists should be attributed to the market 
structure; low internal R&D investment should not be attributed to the low level of external 
R&D or the absence of horizontal R&D cooperation. Such effects should be corrected for as 
far as possible.  
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Veugelers (1997) estimates the impact of external R&D activity – i.a. external R&D 
contracting and R&D cooperation – on internal R&D for a cross section of Flemish firms. 
She corrects for a simultaneous problem between internal and external R&D contracting by 
lagging the latter in regression, but admits that the external R&D expenditure variable has 
significant autocorrelation (Veugelers, 1997: 309). R&D cooperation is time constant. Its 
simultaneous problem with internal R&D is corrected for by fitting R&D cooperation and 
internal R&D into a simultaneous equation set and regressing the equation set by two stage 
OLS. 
We define our basic model to analyze the effect of acquiring external R&D on internal R&D 
activity as
12
: 
 
(3.1)  irdit = β0 + ηerdit + θCOit + dt + nacei + εit   εit = ai + uit 
 
where subscript i and t refer to firm i and time t respectively (subscripts are dropped in text 
for convenience), ird is log of internal R&D expenditures, erd is log of external R&D 
expenditures,  and CO is a dummy taking 1 if the firm cooperates in R&D and 0 if not. dt is 
year dummy, nacei is two digit industry dummies, ai is the firm specific error term and uit is 
the idiosyncratic error term.   
The log-log specification reduces the problem of outliers, as log transformation reduces large 
observed values of R&D expenditures more than small observed values.  
The longitudinal nature of our dataset gives us certain advantages. It allows us, provided that 
certain assumptions are fulfilled, to exploit variance both between and within the firms in the 
dataset. The OLS estimator exploits these two dimensions. For the coefficients to be 
unbiased, the estimator requires both the firm specific and the idiosyncratic error term to be 
uncorrelated with the explanatory variables. This restriction is too strict for our data sample 
since we expect external R&D activities to be endogenous, as described earlier. We therefore 
apply the fixed effect (within group) estimator, which only exploits variation within firms in 
                                                 
12 We do not have sufficient variables to control for other factors. Sales could have been used, but this variable is missing 
for 2009. Including sales, data on R&D for 2009 would be lost in regression, but the results would not be significantly 
altered. We therefore exclude sales, in order to include the R&D variables for 2009. 
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the sample. The estimator requires only the idiosyncratic error term to be uncorrelated with 
the explanatory variables for the coefficients to be unbiased. Both estimators are applied in 
order to reveal possible presence of firm specific effects (i.e. unobserved heterogeneity). As 
time or the number of firms goes to infinity both estimators are consistent. The large 
numbers of firms in our dataset indicate that the last requirement is approximately met. 
We cannot correct for the simultaneous problem noted by Veugelers (1997). According to 
the absorptive capacity, firms performing internal R&D are more likely to engage in external 
R&D activities. Assuming that external R&D activities affect the level of internal R&D as 
well – either as a result of complementarity or substitutability, or also the need for absorptive 
capacity – a simultaneous problem arises. In order to correct for this simultaneous problem, 
we would need time varying exogenous instruments for both the internal R&D variable and 
the external R&D activity variables. The instruments identifying the first should not be 
correlated with the instruments identifying the latter. Due to our limited dataset, we do not 
have proper instruments at hand, and must leave the simultaneous problem unsolved. As all 
R&D variables seem highly correlated with itself over time, and one year of observations is 
lost in regression when lagging the explanatory variables, we do not find Granger causality 
appropriate to correct for the simultaneous problem either.  
On the other hand, we expect much of the endogeneity of external R&D activities to be 
corrected for by applying the fixed effect estimator; all time constant, firm specific effects, 
such as industry, geographical location, and to some extent market structure, level of 
spillovers in the industry, firm size etc. is corrected for. In addition, the year dummies also 
corrects for endogeneity by capturing external shocks affecting all firms in the sample 
simultaneously. E.g. demand and supply shocks should be captured by these dummies. For 
our OLS estimation we have included a set of industry dummies as well as year dummies. 
This will control for some of the industry specific effects, reducing the bias in the OLS 
estimates. These are not included in the FE regressions, seeing that they are present in the 
time constant and firm specific effects which will disappear when running the FE-estimation. 
However, it should be noted that the idiosyncratic error term is still required to be 
uncorrelated with the external R&D activity variables
13
. 
                                                 
13 Additional ways of correcting for potentially endogeneity would be to instrument the external R&D activities but this is 
not possible in our case. Our dataset is limited, and we do not have any variables that identifies external R&D contracting or 
R&D cooperation and meets the exogenous requirement. 
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Multinational R&D ties 
We pay special attention to possible differences in R&D activity between multinational and 
non-multinational firms. External R&D contracting is therefore differentiated into two parts: 
Contracting with a foreign firm within the same enterprise and other contracting (merd and 
oerd respectively). We redefine the model as:  
 
(3.2)  irdit = β0 + η1merdit + η2oerdit + θCOit + dt + nacei + εit   εit = ai + uit 
 
R&D cooperation 
R&D cooperation is differentiated into horizontal, vertical and institutional cooperation, as 
well as cooperation with a foreign or domestic firm within the same enterprise (HCO, VCO, 
ICO, MCO and DCO respectively). These different forms of R&D cooperation are found to 
affect internal R&D activity differently in both theoretical and empirical studies (cf. section 
2.5 on theory and empirics of R&D cooperation). Multinational firms are thought to be more 
frequently engaged in R&D cooperation. Bertrand (2009) finds that target firms increase 
external R&D purchases from domestic firms after acquisition, in a study of French firms. 
Taking these relationships into consideration, (3.2) should be extended
14
. The extended 
model is: 
(3.3)  irdit = β0 + η1merdit + η2oerdit + θ1MCOit + θ2DCOit + θ3HCOit + θ4VCOit + θ5ICOit 
+ dt + nacei + εit   εit = ai + uit 
 
We apply the fixed effect estimator on both (3.2) and (3.3) in order to correct as much as 
possible for the initially expected endogeneity of external R&D contracting and R&D 
cooperation as described earlier in this section. 
 
                                                 
14 One should however note that an extensive division of the variables reduces the number of observations available for the 
regression; the aggregated cooperation variable has, necessarily, more observations. As noted earlier in this chapter, the 
estimator is consistent when the number of firms approaches infinity. By reducing the number of observation this 
requirement will be harder to reach. 
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3.4 Regression results 
 
Estimating equation (3.1) we find positive effects on internal R&D using both OLS and FE 
for both cooperation in R&D and contracted R&D. The coefficients from the OLS differs to 
some extent from those from the FE, which is not surprising seeing that we expect some 
unobserved heterogeneity to be present. The regression results are presented in table 3.1
15
.  
Table 3.1: Regression results. All firms. 
 Internal 
R&D 
Internal 
R&D 
Internal 
R&D 
Internal 
R&D 
Internal 
R&D 
Internal 
R&D 
Model (3.1) (3.1) (3.2) (3.2) (3.3) (3.3) 
Estimator OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE 
External R&D 
 
0.5055
***
 
(0.0070) 
0.3410
***
 
(0.0100) 
    
External R&D from same 
enterprise abroad 
  0.0515
**
  
(0.0181) 
0.0611
*
 
(0.0252) 
0.0644
** 
(0.0229) 
0.0335 
(0.0323) 
External R&D from 
others 
  0.4879
***
 
(0.0143) 
0.3044
***
 
(0.0232) 
0.4340
***
  
(0.0181) 
0.2502
***
 
(0.0297) 
R&D cooperation 
 
6.0643
*** 
(0.0979) 
3.2268
***
 
(0.1112) 
7.5253
***
 
(0.1207) 
3.8015
***
 
(0.1494) 
  
R&D cooperation with 
same enterprise abroad 
    0.5812’ 
(0.2926) 
0.1529 
(0.3126) 
R&D cooperation with 
same enterprise domestic 
    0.3631 
(0.2733) 
0.4926’ 
(0.2911) 
R&D cooperation 
horizontal 
    -0.0269 
(0.2667) 
0.5859
*
 
(0.2479) 
R&D cooperation vertical     4.7561
***
 
(0.2184) 
1.5196
***
 
(0.2057) 
R&D cooperation 
institutional 
    3.6713
***
 
(0.2349) 
1.7979
***
  
(0.2173) 
Constant 
 
1.9496
***
 
(0.5516) 
2.8737
***
 
(0.0913) 
1.3044
***
 
(0.6635) 
2.1309
***
 
(0.0923) 
2.3737
***
 
(0.6907) 
2.198
***
 
(0.1020) 
Industry dummies Included  Included  Included  
Year dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included 
R
2
 (overall for FE) 0.5080 0.4431 0.3758 0.2929 0.3407 0.2409 
N obs. 37,659 37,659 32,158 32,158 23,717 23,717 
‘ significant at 10%, * significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%, and *** significant at 0.1%. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses. Internal and external R&D are log of R&D expenditures in 2009 NOK. R&D cooperation 
is dummies, taking 1 if cooperation and 0 otherwise. All regressions ran in STATA software.  
 
Expanding the model we disaggregate contracted R&D, introducing external R&D from 
same enterprise abroad and external R&D from other sources as explanatory variables. The 
                                                 
15 We also ran the random effect (RE) estimator. This estimator utilizes variation both between and within the firms in the 
sample. As with the OLS estimator, the RE estimator also requires the firm specific, the idiosyncratic error term and the 
explanatory variables to be uncorrelated. It can be shown that the RE estimator is more efficient than the FE estimator if its 
requirements is fulfilled (Verbeek 2008: 366). We ran the RE estimator, and tested if the firm specific error term and the 
explanatory variables were uncorrelated. Comparing estimates from the FE and RE estimations by a Hausman test revealed 
correlation. Hence, the RE requirements were breached, and estimates were dropped. 
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estimated effects of the fixed effect estimator suggest that external R&D from sources 
outside the enterprise has a greater impact on intramural R&D than R&D contracted out to 
foreign firms within the enterprise. The disaggregation of contracted R&D also leads to 
increased stimulation of intramural R&D following a decision to engage in R&D 
cooperation. 
 
We finally estimate equation (3.3), where we disaggregate the cooperation dummy as well. 
Controlling for a set of different cooperation strategies, and two sources of contracting out 
R&D, our results suggest that contracted R&D and cooperation with foreign affiliates within 
the enterprise no longer has a significant impact on internal R&D spending. Cooperation  
 
Table 3.2: Regression results, firm size subsamples 
 Internal 
R&D 
Internal 
R&D 
Internal 
R&D 
Internal 
R&D 
Internal 
R&D 
Internal 
R&D 
Firm size Small Small Medium Medium Large Large 
Model (3.3) (3.3) (3.3) (3.3) (3.3) (3.3) 
Estimator OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE 
External R&D from same 
enterprise abroad 
-0.0041 
(0.0433) 
0.0176 
(0.0588) 
0.0491 
(0.0365) 
0.0415 
(0.0515) 
0.135
***
 
(0.0430) 
0.0645 
(0.0627) 
External R&D from others 0.467
***
 
(0.0293) 
0.156
***
 
(0.0437) 
0.436
***
 
(0.0285) 
0.254
***
 
(0.0451) 
0.383
***
 
(0.0412) 
0.309
***
 
(0.0804) 
R&D cooperation with 
same enterprise abroad 
0.510 
(0.527) 
0.432 
(0.475) 
1.174
**
 
(0.432) 
0.484 
(0.500) 
-0.888 
(0.640) 
-1.429
*
 
(0.666) 
R&D cooperation with 
same enterprise domestic 
0.253 
(0.445) 
-0.295 
(0.514) 
0.459 
(0.433) 
1.050
*
 
(0.441) 
0.604 
(0.592) 
0.857 
(0.618) 
R&D cooperation 
horizontal 
0.018 
(0.425) 
0.732’ 
(0.402) 
0.143 
(0.418) 
0.862
*
 
(0.416) 
-0.365 
(0.584) 
0.0475 
(0.490) 
R&D cooperation vertical 5.150
***
 
(0.309) 
1.179
***
 
(0.317) 
4.183
***
 
(0.344) 
1.600
***
 
(0.319) 
3.180
***
 
(0.649) 
0.689 
(0.553) 
R&D cooperation 
institutional 
3.532
***
 
(0.339) 
1.860
***
 
(0.327) 
3.504
***
 
(0.354) 
1.688
***
 
(0.345) 
3.806
***
 
(0.727) 
2.478
***
 
(0.659) 
Constant 
 
1.211 
(0.782) 
2.343
***
 
(0.094) 
3.922
**
 
(1.329) 
3.117
***
 
(0.109) 
0.819 
(0.756) 
4.285
***
 
(0.288) 
Industry dummies Included  Included  Included  
Year dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included 
R
2
 (overall for FE) 0.3375 0.1834 0.3350 0.2276 0.5023 0.3912 
N 13,012 13,012 8,741 8,741 1,964 1,964 
‘ significant at 10%, * significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%, and *** significant at 0.1%. Standard errors in 
parentheses. Internal and external R&D are log of R&D expenditures in 2009 NOK. R&D cooperation is 
dummies, taking 1 if cooperation and 0 otherwise. All regressions ran in STATA software. Small firms have 
less than 50 employees, medium up to 249, and large firms more than 250 employees. 
 
with domestic firms within the enterprise turns out to be significant at a 10 % level, with a 
coefficient of 0.4926. This suggests that a decision to pursue the strategy will increase 
internal R&D spending by roughly 49 %. All other cooperation dummies are significant at 
the 5 % level or lower. When it comes to contracting out R&D we find that external R&D 
acquired outside the enterprise has a highly significant positive impact on internal R&D. A 
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1 % increase in R&D bought outside the enterprise increases internal R&D spending with 
0.25 %. The implications for these findings will be discussed in the next section. 
Dividing the sample with respect to firm size we find that the effects on internal R&D vary 
somewhat dependent on firm-size. When it comes to contracted R&D only R&D purchased 
from others has a significant coefficient, as for the full sample. Compared to our previous 
results there are some differences; 1) domestic cooperation within the enterprise is 
significant only for medium sized firms and 2) horizontal and vertical cooperation is 
insignificant for large firms. The relative effect of the various forms of cooperation differs to 
some extent between the groups as well. All significant coefficients are positive, and 
economically significant. The magnitudes of the coefficients are hard to assess, seeing that 
we haven’t come across any papers with comparable variable and model specifications.    
 
For large firms with more than 250 employees two factors stimulates investments in internal 
R&D; a) external R&D from others, b) institutional R&D cooperation. Both coefficients are 
positive and economically significant, e.g. the coefficient for R&D cooperation with 
institutions suggesting that pursuing this strategy will increase expenditures on intramural 
R&D with 247.8 %. R&D cooperation with a foreign firm within the same enterprise is 
insignificant for small and medium sized firms, but significantly negative for large firms. 
The coefficient suggests an unrealistic high drop in internal R&D of 142.9 %. The 
magnitudes of the cooperation variables will be discussed in next chapter. 
 
The medium sized firms in our sample face positive effects from all variables except those 
concerning R&D interactions with foreign firms in same enterprise. All coefficients are 
positive and very much economically significant. For the small firms we find that vertical 
and institutional cooperation, along with external R&D bought outside the enterprise has a 
statistical and economical significant impact on internal R&D.  
 
Our final estimation for this chapter considers possible differences between the 
manufacturing and service sector. We have classified firms as manufacturing or service 
firms using the NACE codes in our data
16
.   
                                                 
16Manufacturing firms are defined as all firms with NACE-codes up to 50. Service firms are defined as all other firms with 
NACE-codes starting at 50. 
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Institutional cooperation seems to have an approximately identical effect on the firms, 
independent of industry, coefficients estimated to 1.920 and 1.777 for manufacturing and 
service firms respectively. Vertical cooperation are statistically significant for both 
industries, however the estimated effect is roughly twice as high for manufacturing firms. 
When it comes to horizontal cooperation the coefficients are fairly similar, the effect being a 
bit higher for service firms. External R&D from other sources outside the enterprise is 
statistically significant for both groups, with similar magnitude of the coefficients. For the 
firms in the service sector we find positive effects for domestic R&D cooperation within the 
enterprise. All statistically significant variables contribute to an increase in intramural R&D 
and are all economically significant. Out results suggest that cooperation in R&D outside the 
enterprise stimulates investments in intramural R&D independent of industry.    
 
Table 3.3: Regression results for internal R&D and external R&D sources. 
 Internal R&D Internal R&D Internal R&D Internal R&D 
Firm sector Manufacturers Manufacturers Service Service 
Model (3.3) (3.3) (3.3) (3.3) 
Estimator OLS FE OLS FE 
External R&D from same 
enterprise abroad 
0.0387 
(0.0288) 
0.0102 
(0.0443) 
0.109
***
 
(0.0381) 
0.0665 
(0.0496) 
External R&D from others 0.430
***
 
(0.0223) 
0.256
***
 
(0.0401) 
0.440
***
 
(0.0334) 
0.241
***
 
(0.0444) 
R&D cooperation with same 
enterprise abroad 
0.979
**
 
(0.382) 
-0.292 
(0.396) 
0.0185 
(0.449) 
0.839 
(0.533) 
R&D cooperation with same 
enterprise domestic 
0.125 
(0.348) 
0.101 
(0.366) 
0.736’ 
(0.441) 
1.104
*
 
(0.472) 
R&D cooperation horizontal -0.071 
(0.338) 
0.590’ 
(0.319) 
0.066 
(0.432) 
0.724’ 
(0.393) 
R&D cooperation vertical 4.999
***
 
(0.283) 
1.784
***
 
(0.268) 
4.349
***
 
(0.342) 
0.811
*
 
(0.317) 
R&D cooperation institutional 3.533
***
 
(0.308) 
1.920
***
 
(0.292) 
3.934
***
 
(0.362) 
1.777
***
 
(0.326) 
Constant 
 
2.134
***
 
(0.705) 
2.54
***
 
(0.0912) 
1.686
*
 
(0.745) 
3.131
***
 
(0.141) 
Industry dummies Included  Included  
Year dummies Included Included Included Included 
R
2
 (overall for FE) 0.3266 0.2638 0.3629 0.2044 
N 14,495 14,495 9,222 9,222 
‘ significant at 10%, * significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%, and *** significant at 0.1%. Standard errors in 
parentheses. Internal and external R&D are log of R&D expenditures in 2009 NOK. R&D cooperation are 
dummies, taking 1 if cooperation and 0 otherwise. All regressions ran in STATA software. Manufacturers also 
include fishing, mining, energy and construction sectors. 
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3.5  Discussion and concluding remarks 
 
The coefficient for buying external R&D sources outside the enterprise is fairly similar in all 
cases, with some deviation for small and large firms. The positive effect points towards a 
possible complementary relationship between internal R&D spending and R&D acquired 
outside the enterprise. This seems reasonable due to absorptive capacity. The investments in 
intramural R&D are necessary for the firms to process and exploit new information. 
Disaggregation of the cooperation dummy removes most of the explanatory power of the 
dummies concerning cooperation within the enterprise. Vertical and institutional cooperation 
have a significantly greater impact on internal R&D spending on average.   
One possible error in our estimation would be if there was too little variation in our 
variables. For the estimation to tell us anything about the effects of cooperation or 
contracting the transition from one state to another, e.g. entering a vertical R&D cooperation, 
must be made by a sufficient number of firms. To check for this we have tabulated all 
dummies with a mean between 0 and 1 for all samples. We find that for large firms 139 
firms make a transition when it comes to cooperation with foreign firms within the 
enterprise. This is the dummy with least variation in the samples, thus we conclude that our 
estimations don’t suffer from neither too few observations nor too little variation.    
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4. Internal and external R&D – complements or 
substitutes? 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, we seek to find out if external R&D and internal R&D are complements or 
substitutes. In chapter 3 we found evidence for some external R&D sources to increase 
internal R&D activity among Norwegian firms. We pointed out the need for absorptive 
capacity as one explanation for the positive relationship. Beyond the need for absorptive 
capacity, external R&D may complement internal R&D, giving the firm incentives to 
increase internal R&D when entering an R&D cooperative or contracting out R&D. On the 
other side, the effect of R&D contracting on internal R&D was less than proportional, 
indicating a positive, but decreasing relationship; for large levels of internal R&D, external 
R&D sourcing may be substitutable with internal R&D. For external R&D sources not 
affecting the level of internal R&D, a substitutable rather than complementary relationship 
between the two are more likely to exist. 
In order to reveal possible complementarity or substitutability between internal and external 
R&D, both must be treated as inputs for innovation. The factors are complementary if an 
increase in one of the factors leads to an increase in the marginal productivity of the other. If 
the effect is negative, they are substitutes. A further description of the modelling of internal 
and external R&D as input factors in innovation is given in section 4.2 “Model 
specification”.  
While internal R&D is found to increase after acquiring non-multinational external R&D, 
there is no sign of innovative superiority for R&D active firms with non-multinational 
external R&D ties. On the other side, firms with multinational R&D ties hold a higher level 
of innovativeness. Figure 4.1 shows that firms with multinational R&D ties have a varying 
and sometimes higher level of sales attributable to new sales than firms with other external 
R&D ties as well as firms only performing internal R&D. Firms with other external R&D 
ties have slightly higher levels of new sales than firms relying solely on performing internal 
R&D. A less clear pattern appears for manufacturers and services in figure 4.2. Firms with 
multinational R&D ties, non-multinational external R&D ties, and firms only performing 
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internal R&D, do not seem to differ significantly among manufacturers. Services with 
multinational R&D ties seem to have a slightly higher level of new sales than other services. 
Figure 4.1 and 4.2 show that firms combining internal R&D and external R&D have only 
slightly higher levels of new sales than those who only perform internal R&D. Given that an 
average firm only performing internal R&D faces the same price for internal R&D as an 
average firm with external R&D ties in addition to internal R&D, no clear differences in 
innovativeness between the two firms indicate diseconomies of scope, i.e. substitutability, in 
internal R&D and external R&D. 
Figure 4.1: Share of sales attributed to new products among small, medium sized and large R&D active 
firms 
   
Source: R&D and innovation surveys, Statistics Norway. The survey covers all Norwegian firms with more 
than 50 employees, and a sample of firms with 10-49 employees. Aggregation based on weights provided by 
Statistics Norway. Multinational R&D tie refers to firms either purchasing R&D from, or collaborates in R&D 
with, a foreign firm within the same enterprise, or both. Non-multinational external R&D tie refers to either 
R&D purchasing or R&D cooperation with all other firms.Small firms have less than 50 employees, medium 
up to 249, and large firms more than 250 employees. 
 
The literature section gave an overview of theoretical approaches, as well as empirical 
evidence, on how internal R&D and external R&D interact as inputs of innovation. 
According to the absorptive capacity theory, a certain level of internal R&D is required to 
utilize external R&D sources (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; 1990; Mowery and Oxley, 1995). 
However, one should not expect this part of internal R&D to affect the innovation activity 
per se; the effect of external R&D on innovation should be attributed to the external R&D 
only, and the absorptive capacity should be considered as nothing more than an interpreter of 
external R&D.  
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Figure 4.2: Share of sales attributed to new products among R&D active manufacturers and services 
  
Source: R&D and innovation surveys, Statistics Norway. 
 
In the case of substitutability between (the non-absorptive capacity part of) internal R&D 
and external R&D sourcing, external R&D should have the same properties as internal R&D, 
including the impact on the marginal returns to innovation of the latter. Hence, under the 
assumption of decreasing marginal returns of internal R&D, external R&D should lower the 
marginal return of internal R&D for any given level of the latter. For a given price of internal 
R&D (which may be interpreted as the alternative cost of internal R&D investments), 
external R&D sourcing should, ceteris paribus, lower the optimal level of internal R&D. 
Hence, substitutability and absorptive capacity may pull the effect of external R&D on total 
internal R&D in opposite directions; substitutability makes external R&D replace and reduce 
the non-absorptive capacity part of internal R&D, while the absorptive capacity requires an 
increase in the absorptive capacity part of internal R&D, making the effect on total internal 
R&D ambiguous.  
On the other hand, if synergies between external R&D and the non-absorptive capacity part 
of internal R&D arises external R&D sourcing will raise the marginal return of internal R&D 
for any given level of the latter. Internal R&D and external R&D sourcing will then be 
complements and the optimal level of internal R&D should increase. Hence, both 
complementarity and absorptive capacity should, other things equal, increase the optimal 
level of internal R&D. 
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If the level of absorptive capacity does not affect the economies of scale of internal R&D, 
and neither substitutability nor complementarity exists, external R&D sources should have 
no impact on the marginal product of internal R&D. 
In the following, we model and estimate the impact of acquiring external R&D on the 
marginal effect of internal R&D on innovativeness in order to reveal possible 
complementarity or substitutability between internal R&D and different external R&D 
sources. 
 
4.2 Data  
 
We use the same data and variables for estimation as in section 3. See section 3.2 for further 
description. Two variables are used to measure innovativeness. Following i.a. Crépon et al. 
(1998) we use the share of novel sales to total sales. We also use whether or not the firm has 
made any product or process innovation (i.e. an innovation dummy, taking 1 if innovation 
and 0 otherwise), following i.a. Schmiedeberg (2008) and Criscuolo et al. (2005). 
 
Variable construction 
The share of new sales and innovation variables were only available for 2001, 2003, 2004, 
2006 and 2008. The variable new sales refers to the share of sales attributed to sale of new or 
considerably improved products introduced the prior or last two years. The variable 
innovation refers to whether or not the firm has made a product or process innovation also 
during the prior or last two years. Hence the variables contain information on the 
innovativeness for three years intervals. We therefore have constructed the explanatory 
variables of R&D expenditures and sales as a three year average. The cooperation variables 
take the form 1 if a firm has been engaged in cooperation in one of the three years and 0 if 
not. We are, unfortunately, not able to control for the overlapping caused by the fact that the 
variables appears every two years and contains information on a three year period. Appendix 
C contains detailed information of the variable construction. Sales are deflated using the 
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Consumer Price Index from Statistics Norway. A list of descriptive statistics for all variables 
is presented in appendix B. 
 
4.3 Model specification 
 
We treat internal R&D and external R&D activities as inputs in the innovation process. In 
order to reveal possible complementarity or substitutability between internal and external 
R&D activities, we would like to estimate the impact of external R&D activity on the 
marginal effect of internal R&D activities on innovation. We do this by specifying the cross 
product of internal and external R&D activities in addition to separate variables for internal 
R&D and external R&D activities. 
 
(4.1) Innoit = τ0 + φirdit + ωerdit + κEerditirdit + λCOit + κCCOit irdit + τ1sit + dt+nacei+ εit 
  εit = ai + uit 
 
where – for firm i at time t – Inno is innovativeness, ird is log of internal R&D expenditures, 
erd is log of external R&D expenditures, CO is a dummy, taking 1 if the firm cooperates in 
R&D and 0 if not, erdird and COird are the cross products, s is log of sales, dt is year 
dummy, nacei is two digit industry dummiy, ai is the firm specific error term and uit is the 
idiosyncratic error term. Innovation is measured both as: a dummy, taking 1 if the firm has 
made a product or process innovation the current or last two years or 0 otherwise; percentage 
of sales attributed to products introduced or substantially improved the current or last two 
years. The variables containing R&D expenditures are specified on log-form in order to 
reduce the size of outliers. 
Schmiedberg (2008) specify a similar model, regressing i.a. internal R&D, R&D contracting 
and R&D cooperation on both percentage of sales attributed to new products and number of 
patents on a cross section. All three variables are specified as binary, taking 1 in the case of 
performing an R&D activity and 0 otherwise. Instrumenting the choice of conducting 
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internal and external R&D or not, she finds weak evidence for complementarity between 
internal and external R&D.  
The results of chapter 3 indicate that the variables containing external R&D contracting and 
R&D cooperation in model (4.1) should be split up. In chapter 3, we found significant 
differences between R&D contracting with foreign firms within the same enterprise and 
R&D contracting with others with respect to their effect on internal R&D expenditures. We 
found significant differences in the effects of different forms of R&D cooperation partners 
on internal R&D expenditures as well. We expect the different forms of R&D contracting 
and R&D cooperation to have different properties with respect to internal R&D; some may 
be substitutable and others complementary, making the estimated effect of the aggregated 
external R&D and R&D cooperation variables in (4.1) ambiguous. We define our augmented 
model as: 
 
(4.2) Innoit = τ0 + λirdit + ω1merdit + κ1merditirdit + ω2oerdit + κ2oerdit irdit + λ3MCOit + 
κ3MCOit irdit + λ4DCOit + κ4DCOit irdit + λ5HCOit + κ5HCOit irdit + λ6VCOit + κ6VCOit irdit  
+ λ7ICOit + κ7ICOit irdit + τ1sit +
 
dt + nacei +  εit  εit = ai + uit 
 
Following the endogenous growth theory, R&D activities and innovation may be connected 
with productivity growth. At the aggregate level, productivity is interpreted as the 
knowledge stock, and growth in the knowledge stock interpreted as the production of new 
ideas and new knowledge. The latter relationship is modelled as a knowledge production 
function, where the current stock of knowledge, or its time derivative, is defined as a 
function of past knowledge stock and current knowledge input (Griliches 1979; Romer 1990; 
Jones 1995; 2005). In empirical approaches, the knowledge stock is seen as the innovative 
capability or innovative success: “its technological knowledge obtained via R&D or its 
competency at transforming research results into useful products and processes (Hall, 2011: 
10)”. Treating Inno as growth in the knowledge stock, (4.1) can be specified as a Cobb 
Douglas knowledge production function in level form. We are however careful in 
interpreting model (4.1) as such a knowledge production function since the Cobb Douglas 
form presumes complementarity between the input variables. We can not a priori assume 
internal R&D and external R&D activities to be either complementary or substitutes; in this 
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chapter we explore if internal and external R&D activities are complementary or substitutes 
a posteriori.  
Crépon et al. (1998) provide an econometric framework for combining R&D and innovation 
with productivity (the so called CDM-model in the R&D literature, extended for panel data 
by Raymond et al., (2009)). The CDM-model consists of four sets of equations. The first and 
second equation is a censored regression model for R&D expenditures, which takes account 
for R&D determining variables, including demand pull and technology push variables. The 
third equation expresses innovation, measured either by number of patent or novel sales as 
share of total sales, as a function of R&D input. The last equation expresses labour 
productivity as a function of innovation. Cassiman and Veugelers (2006) build on this 
framework, when examining possible complementarity between making R&D internally and 
contracting R&D externally on a cross section of Belgian manufacturers. As in Schmiedberg 
(2008), internal and external R&D is binary variables. Instrumenting internal and external 
R&D, they model productivity as a supermodular function of internal and external R&D, and 
find evidence for complementarity. 
Our panel data set, where R&D expenditures are on interval form, give us certain advantages 
when estimating (4.1) with respect to new sales. The relationship between innovation and 
R&D activities are expected to be influenced by common unobserved factors (Athey and 
Stern 1998: 3): “[T]he talent and past experience of managers and workers, the beliefs held 
within the firm about current and future market conditions, labour-management relation, the 
formal and informal processes for adapting changes in organizational design in a given firm, 
the influence exerted by various interest groups within the firm, and other adjustment costs” 
all are firm specific and may affect both the level of R&D expenditures, R&D cooperation, 
and the innovativeness. However, they may not be observable in the dataset. Both 
Schmiedberg (2008) and Cassiman and Veugelers (2006) instrument internal and external 
R&D in order to overcome possible endogeneity problems. By applying the fixed effect 
estimator, we can more precisely correct for unobserved heterogeneity, reducing the 
expected endogeneity. However, lacking proper instruments, we are unable to correct for 
possible remaining endogeneity.  
The innovation dummy provides a broader measure for innovativeness than sales attributed 
to new products and to some extent productivity. This dummy captures process as well as 
product innovation. Bergman (2011) and Lokshin et. al. (2007) test for complementary 
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between internal and external R&D activities. They assume R&D to affect labour 
productivity through the knowledge stock, and regress internal R&D, external R&D, and 
their cross product directly on labour productivity. As pointed out by Hall (2011), however 
positive in general, the relationship between innovation, i.e. the knowledge stock, and labour 
productivity is not unambiguous. In a summary of studies on innovations and productivity, 
Hall (2011) states that share of novel sales and product innovations have a stronger impact 
on labour productivity than process innovations. One explanation for this may be the way 
labour productivity is derived. Because productivity is derived from production, measured as 
sale revenues, product innovations and new sales should be expected to be closer related to 
productivity than process innovation. The latter are expected to provide cost reductions, not 
necessarily leading to increased sales, but still increasing profitability. By including process 
innovation in the dependent variable, our approach may better take into account innovations 
leading to cost reductions.  
When using the innovation dummy as an explanatory variable, we are unable to correct for 
unobserved heterogeneity. We would like to apply a binary estimator which corrects for 
unobserved heterogeneity. However, unless one can make assumptions about the correlation 
between the unobserved heterogeneity and the explanatory variables
17
, no such proper 
estimator exists (Wooldridge 2010: 610-619). Greene (2002) shows that the fixed effect 
probit estimator under maximum likelihood suffers from bias in coefficients due to 
unobserved heterogeneity when N  ∞. For T < 8 the bias in the fixed effect probit 
estimator is severe relative to the bias in the probit on a pooled cross-section. If unobserved 
heterogeneity is present, Greene (2002: 14, 18) suggests to use a probit-estimator on a 
pooled-cross section and not the fixed effect estimator for panels with small time series. 
Following Green (2002) and Cruscuolo et. al. (2005) we apply the probit estimator on the 
pooled cross-section, aware of possible positive or negative bias in the estimated 
coefficients. 
 
                                                 
17 such as the Chamberlain’s correlated random effects probit estimator assumes.  
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4.4 Results 
Tables 4.1 – 4.4 report expected but also surprising results. Table 4.1 shows the results from 
the estimation of (4.1) on the whole sample of firms. As expected internal R&D has a 
positive and significant impact on both measurements of innovativeness; a ten percent 
increase in internal R&D expenditures should increase the ratio of new sales to total sales by 
5.59 percentage points and increase the likelihood of making an innovation by 31.9 
percentage points. Surprisingly, external R&D contracting does not seem to affect the 
average firm’s innovativeness. R&D cooperation affects innovativeness positively and 
significantly; establishing R&D cooperation should increase the ratio of new sales to total 
sales by 3.36 percentage points and the likelihood of making an innovation by 34.6 
percentage points. R&D cooperation affects the marginal effect of internal R&D on 
innovativeness, indicating a substitutable relationship between R&D cooperation in general 
and internal R&D; establishing R&D cooperation reduces the effect of internal R&D by 
approximately a half. However, the results from estimations of model (4.2) presented in table 
4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 show a more nuanced picture.  
Table 4.1: Regression results for novel sales and innovation 
 Novel sales Novel sales Innovation 
Model (4.1) (4.1) (4.1) 
Estimator OLS FE Probit 
Internal R&D (ird) 
 
0.00931
***
 
(0.000378) 
0.00549
***
 
(0.000583) 
0.0319
***
 
(0.00073) 
External R&D  -0.00099’ 
(0.000552) 
0.000839 
(0.000802) 
0.00207 
(0.00165) 
ird x external R&D  0.0000687 
(0.0000549) 
-0.000026 
(0.000077) 
-0.000034 
(0.00012) 
R&D cooperation  0.0450
***
 
(0.00623) 
0.0336
*** 
(0.0078) 
0.346
***
 
(0.0182) 
ird x R&D cooperation  -0.000819 
(0.00068) 
-0.00207
* 
(0.000867) 
-0.0150
***
 
(0.00133) 
Sales 
 
-0.00845
***
 
(0.00085) 
-0.00328’ 
(0.0017) 
-0.00183 
(0.00197) 
Constant 
 
0.241
***
 
(0.0304) 
0.194
***
 
(0.0347) 
-1.638
***
 
(0.288) 
Industry dummies Included  Included 
Year dummies Included Included Included 
R
2 
 0.2468 0.1933 0.3093 
N 17,511 17,511 18,330 
‘ significant at 10%, * significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%, and *** significant at 0.1%. Standard errors in 
parentheses. R
2
 is overall for FE and pseudo R
2
 for probit. Novel sales is the sale revenue of new products in 
percent of total sales. Innovation is dummy taking 1 if the firm has made a product or process innovation, and 0 
otherwise. Probit estimates are marginal effects calculated from mean values of explanatory variables. For 
dummies, marginal effects describe changes from 0 to 1 in variable. All regressions ran in STATA software.  
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The results from the OLS-estimation are larger in magnitude than the results from the FE-
estimation. Unobserved heterogeneity was confirmed by running a Hausman-test of FE- and 
RE-estimates for model (4.1). Firm specific effects affect the innovativeness as well as R&D 
strategies and activities as we expected and discussed in the previous section.  
By splitting up the variables, differences between multinational R&D contracting and other 
external R&D contracting, and differences between different forms for R&D cooperation 
with respect to innovativeness appear. The OLS results in table 4.2 are significantly higher 
than the FE-results for model (4.2) as well. We confirm presence of unobserved 
heterogeneity and conclude that the estimates from the OLS are biased. We therefore 
concentrate on the results from the FE-estimator. Table 4.2 shows that internal R&D 
expenditures in model (4.2) has approximately the same effect on innovativeness as in model 
(4.1). Multinational R&D contracting – i.e. external R&D purchases from a foreign firm 
within the same enterprise – has a significant and positive effect on innovativeness; a ten 
percent increase in multinational R&D contracting leads, ceteris paribus, to an increase in 
the share of sales attributed to new products and the likelihood of making innovation by 3.68 
and 16.7 percentage points respectively for the average firm. At the same time, the marginal 
effect of internal R&D on innovativeness is reduced by approximately a third. The latter 
effect indicates internal R&D and multinational R&D contracting to be substitutable.  
Somewhat puzzling, external R&D purchases from others lower the probability of making 
innovations, but are complementary with internal R&D. If the average firm increases 
external R&D purchases from others, the likelihood of innovating should be reduced by 41.8 
percentage points, but at the same time approximately double the marginal effect of internal 
R&D on the same likelihood. External R&D purchases are not found to have a statistically 
significant impact on the share of sales related to new products.  
R&D cooperation with both a foreign firm and a domestic firm within the same enterprise 
increases the likelihood of innovating. The increase in the likelihood of innovating is slightly 
higher for R&D cooperation with a foreign firm within the same enterprise than a domestic 
firm within the same enterprise, 18.9 and 22.5 percentage points respectively. Evidence of 
substitutability is found between internal R&D and R&D cooperation with a firm within the 
same enterprise with respect to the likelihood of innovating. The coefficients of the cross 
products indicate that the marginal effect of internal R&D on the likelihood of innovation 
decreases by approximately a quarter and a third when entering an R&D cooperative with a 
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foreign and domestic firm within the same enterprise respectively. R&D cooperation with a 
domestic firm within the same enterprise has similar effect on the share of sales attributed to 
new products as on the likelihood of innovating. Entering such an R&D cooperative 
increases the share by 3.41 percentage points and reduces the effect of internal R&D by 
more than two thirds.  
Table 4.2: Regression results for novel sales and innovation 
 Novel sales Novel sales Innovation 
Model (4.2) (4.2) (4.2) 
Estimator OLS FE Probit 
Internal R&D (ird) 
 
0.00914
***
 
(0.000333) 
0.00494
***
 
(0.000512) 
0.0323
***
 
(0.0007) 
External R&D from same enterprise 
abroad 
0.00393
**
 
(0.00123) 
0.00368
* 
(0.00185) 
0.0167
***
 
(0.00347) 
ird x external R&D from same enterprise 
abroad 
-0.000309
**
 
(0.000113) 
-0.000251’ 
(0.000151) 
-0.00117
***
 
(0.00025) 
External R&D from others 
 
-0.0134
***
 
(0.00365) 
-0.00538 
(0.00421) 
-0.0418
***
 
(0.0118) 
ird x external R&D from others 
 
0.00116
***
 
(0.000268) 
0.000459 
(0.000346) 
0.00312
***
 
(0.00077) 
R&D cooperation with same enterprise 
abroad 
0.0333
’
 
(0.0193) 
0.0241 
(0.0226) 
0.189
***
 
(0.0496) 
ird x R&D cooperation with same 
enterprise abroad 
-0.00107 
(0.00153) 
0.000496 
(0.00180) 
-0.00735
**
 
(0.00289) 
R&D cooperation with same enterprise 
domestic 
0.0399
**
 
(0.0136) 
0.0341’ 
(0.0178) 
0.225
***
 
(0.0401) 
ird x R&D cooperation with same 
enterprise domestic 
-0.00392
**
 
(0.00117) 
-0.00348
*
 
(0.00159) 
-0.0119
***
 
(0.0024) 
R&D cooperation horizontal 
 
-0.0226 
(0.0143) 
-0.0232 
(0.0206) 
-0.0941
**
 
(0.0289) 
ird x R&D cooperation horizontal 
 
0.000481 
(0.00125) 
0.000868 
(0.00171) 
0.00576
*
 
(0.00282) 
R&D cooperation vertical 
 
0.0359
**
 
(0.0115) 
0.0455
**
 
(0.0131) 
0.267
***
 
(0.0337) 
ird x R&D cooperation vertical 
 
0.00153 
(0.00108) 
-0.00124 
(0.00119) 
-0.00761
***
 
(0.00217) 
R&D cooperation institutional 
 
0.0134 
(0.012) 
0.000754 
(0.0153) 
0.159
***
 
(0.0352) 
ird x R&D cooperation institutional 
 
-0.00118 
(0.00107) 
0.0000517 
(0.00132) 
-0.00976
***
 
(0.00229) 
Sales 
 
-0.00944
***
 
(0.000934) 
-0.00287 
(0.00193) 
-0.00147 
(0.00227) 
Constant 
 
0.131
***
 
(0.0269) 
0.0737
*
 
(0.0355) 
-2.266
***
 
(0.293) 
Industry dummies Included  Included 
Year dummies Included Included Included 
R
2 
(pseudo R
2
 for probit) 0.2513 0.1938 0.3311 
N 15,752 15,752 15,811 
‘ significant at 10%, * significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%, and *** significant at 0.1%. Standard errors in 
parentheses. Novel sales is the sale revenue of new products in percent of total sales. Innovation is dummy 
taking 1 if the firm has made a product or process innovation, and 0 otherwise. Internal and external R&D are 
log of R&D expenditures in 2009 NOK. R&D cooperation is dummies, taking 1 if cooperation and 0 otherwise. 
Sales are log of sales in 2009 NOK. Probit estimates are marginal effects calculated from mean values of 
explanatory variables. For dummies, marginal effects describe changes from 0 to 1 in variable. All regressions 
ran in STATA software.  
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Horizontal R&D cooperation lowers the probability of innovating for the average firm by 
9.41 percentage points, while vertical and institutional R&D cooperation increases the same 
probability by 26.7 and 15.9 percentage points respectively. R&D cooperation with 
competitors and internal R&D are found to be complements, although somewhat small of 
magnitude. Both vertical and institutional R&D cooperation are found to be substitutes with 
internal R&D, each reducing the marginal return on innovation of internal R&D by 
approximately a quarter. Regarding the effect of horizontal, vertical and institutional R&D 
cooperation when new sales is dependent variable, only vertical R&D cooperation gives a 
statistically significant effect. Vertical R&D cooperation gives an increase in the revenue 
from new sales to total sales ratio of 4.55 percentage points for the average firm. No 
substitutability or complementarity with internal R&D is found.  
By splitting up the sample, some differences across firm sizes and firm sectors appear. Table 
4.3 presents the results from estimating (4.2) on small, medium sized and large firms 
respectively. Table 4.4 shows the results for manufacturers and services. The effects of 
internal R&D on new sales and innovation is relatively higher for small firms, but do not 
seem to differ much between medium sized and large firms or between manufacturers and 
services. However, regarding the effect on new sales, this may be attributed to the fact that 
larger firms normally have a much larger stock of products, requiring a large turnover of 
products to give a significant change in the sale of new products to total sales ratio.  
Multinational R&D contracting becomes insignificant for medium sized and large firms with 
respect to new sales. For all firm sizes external R&D purchases from a foreign firm within 
the same enterprise has a significant and positive impact on the probability of innovating. 
The effect on innovation is almost the same for manufacturers and services. For new sales it 
is significant and positive for small firms and manufacturers only. Multinational R&D 
contracting and internal R&D is found to be substitutable with respect to the likelihood of 
making innovations. The substitutable relationship is stronger for larger firms than medium 
sized and small firm.   
External R&D purchases from others affect innovation for medium sized and large firms, 
and for manufacturers only. The likelihood of innovation is negatively affected. For these 
subsamples complementarities between external R&D from others and internal R&D are 
found. Hence, the effect of external R&D purchases on innovativeness is still negative and 
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has complementary properties with internal R&D. The puzzle is now limited to 
manufacturers, and small and medium sized firms. 
Table 4.3: Regression results for novel sales and innovation. Small, medium and large firms. 
 Novel sales Innovation Novel sales Innovation Novel sales Innovation 
Firm size Small Small Medium Medium Large Large 
Model (3.2) (3.3) (3.2) (3.3) (3.2) (3.3) 
Estimator FE Probit FE Probit FE Probit 
Internal R&D (ird) 
 
0.00726
***
 
(0.00108) 
0.0332
***
 
(0.00099) 
0.00342
***
 
(0.000623) 
0.0302
***
 
(0.00114) 
0.00306
*
 
(0.00135) 
0.0307
***
 
(0.00289) 
External R&D from same 
enterprise abroad 
0.00548
*
 
(0.00234) 
0.0135
*
 
(0.00534) 
0.00396 
(0.00354) 
0.0221
***
 
(0.00525) 
0.00271 
(0.00257) 
0.0196 
(0.0122) 
ird x external R&D from 
same enterprise abroad 
-0.000305 
(0.000224) 
-0.000907
*
 
(0.00042) 
-0.000286 
(0.000291) 
-0.00137
**
 
(0.0004) 
-0.000099 
(0.000198) 
-0.00173
*
 
(0.00082) 
External R&D from others -0.00769 
(0.00804) 
-0.0032 
(0.0208) 
-0.00553 
(0.00626) 
-0.0849
***
 
(0.0228) 
-0.0192 
(0.0127) 
-0.0437 
(0.0275) 
ird x external R&D from 
others 
0.000931 
(0.000755) 
0.000465 
(0.00138) 
0.000463 
(0.000536) 
0.00587
***
 
(0.00151) 
0.00110 
(0.000803) 
0.00435
*
 
(0.00171) 
R&D cooperation with same 
enterprise abroad 
0.00660 
(0.0506) 
0.194
*
 
(0.0987) 
-0.0133 
(0.0308) 
0.187
**
 
(0.0687) 
0.136
**
 
(0.0433) 
0.301
*
 
(0.125) 
ird x R&D cooperation with 
same enterprise abroad 
0.00157 
(0.00415) 
-0.00638 
(0.00526) 
0.0019 
(0.00238) 
-0.00703’ 
(0.00422) 
-0.00556’ 
(0.00302) 
-0.0148’ 
(0.009) 
R&D cooperation with same 
enterprise domestic 
0.0722 
(0.0457) 
0.163
*
 
(0.0661) 
0.0068 
(0.0215) 
0.234
***
 
(0.0586) 
0.0460 
(0.0401) 
0.235
*
 
(0.117) 
ird x R&D cooperation with 
same enterprise domestic 
-0.00859
*
 
(0.00427) 
-0.011
**
 
(0.00386) 
-0.00156 
(0.00214) 
-0.0112
**
 
(0.00373) 
-0.00199 
(0.00287) 
-0.0112 
(0.00795) 
R&D cooperation 
horizontal 
-0.0759
* 
(0.0383) 
-0.153
***
 
(0.0251) 
-0.0303 
(0.0356) 
-0.0616 
(0.0547) 
0.00321 
(0.0267) 
0.0353 
(0.116) 
ird x R&D cooperation 
horizontal 
0.00323 
(0.00354) 
0.0123
**
 
(0.00434) 
0.00148 
(0.00283) 
0.00416 
(0.0047) 
-0.00201 
(0.00227) 
-0.00707 
(0.00818) 
R&D cooperation vertical 0.0904
**
 
(0.0297) 
0.342
***
 
(0.0521) 
0.0317
*
 
(0.0156) 
0.211
***
 
(0.0524) 
0.00652 
(0.0198) 
0.283
**
 
(0.100) 
ird x R&D cooperation 
vertical 
-0.00226 
(0.00265) 
-0.00927
**
 
(0.0031) 
-0.000629 
(0.00162) 
-0.0061’ 
(0.00356) 
-0.0000329 
(0.00165) 
-0.00795 
(0.00767) 
R&D cooperation 
institutional 
0.0285 
(0.0395) 
0.233
***
 
(0.0593) 
0.0118 
(0.0198) 
0.123
*
 
(0.0534) 
-0.0203 
(0.0198) 
0.119 
(0.102) 
ird x R&D cooperation 
institutional 
-0.00288 
(0.00315) 
-0.0167
***
 
(0.00343) 
-0.000067 
(0.00184) 
-0.00471 
(0.00366) 
0.000664 
(0.00188) 
-0.00285 
(0.00772) 
Sales 
 
-0.00785
*
 
(0.00377) 
0.000583 
(0.00374) 
0.000713 
(0.00266) 
0.000514 
(0.00482) 
-0.00565 
(0.00554) 
-0.00487 
(0.0104) 
Constant 
 
0.154
* 
(0.0651) 
-2.243
***
 
(0.4287) 
0.00998 
(0.0509) 
-2.577
*** 
(0.494) 
0.146 
(0.112) 
-1.131’ 
(0.613) 
Industry dummies  Included  Included  Included 
Year dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included 
R
2 
(pseudo R
2
 for probit) 0.2528 0.3564 0.1575 0.3079 0.1170 0.3589 
N 8,131 8,101 6,106 6,104 1,515 1,488 
 ‘ significant at 10%, * significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%, and *** significant at 0.1%. Standard errors in 
parentheses. Novel sales is the sale revenue of new products in percent of total sales. Innovation is dummy 
taking 1 if the firm has made a product or process innovation, and 0 otherwise. Internal and external R&D are 
log of R&D expenditures in 2009 NOK. R&D cooperation is dummies, taking 1 if cooperation and 0 otherwise. 
Sales are log of sales in 2009 NOK. Probit estimates are marginal effects calculated from mean values of 
explanatory variables. For dummies, marginal effects describe changes from 0 to 1 in variable. All regressions 
ran in STATA software. Small firms have less than 50 employees, medium up to 249, and large firms more 
than 250 employees. 
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Table 4.4: Regression results for novel sales and innovation. Small, medium and large firms. 
 Novel sales Innovation Novel sales Innovation 
Firm sector Manufacturers Manufacturers Services Services 
Model (3.2) (3.3) (3.2) (3.3) 
Estimator FE Probit FE Probit 
Internal R&D (ird) 
 
0.00446
***
 
(0.000543) 
0.0336
***
 
(0.0009) 
0.00571
***
 
(0.00106) 
0.0304
***
 
(0.00113) 
External R&D from same 
enterprise abroad 
0.00405’ 
(0.00208) 
0.0165
***
 
(0.00436) 
0.00148 
(0.00397) 
0.0183
**
 
(0.0058) 
ird x external R&D from 
same enterprise abroad 
-0.000236 
(0.000161) 
-0.00102
**
 
(0.00032) 
-0.000167 
(0.000321) 
-0.00151
***
 
(0.00042) 
External R&D from others -0.00435 
(0.00413) 
-0.0455
***
 
(0.0143) 
-0.000523 
(0.0117) 
-0.0242 
(0.0229) 
ird x external R&D from 
others 
0.000153 
(0.000348) 
0.00307
**
 
(0.00094) 
0.000492 
(0.000805) 
0.00247’ 
(0.00145) 
R&D cooperation with same 
enterprise abroad 
-0.00734 
(0.0355) 
0.0711 
(0.0799) 
0.0597
*
 
(0.0302) 
0.233
***
 
(0.0623) 
ird x R&D cooperation with 
same enterprise abroad 
0.00309 
(0.00253) 
-0.00024 
(0.00496) 
-0.00246 
(0.00297) 
-0.0109
**
 
(0.0038) 
R&D cooperation with same 
enterprise domestic 
0.0243 
(0.0234) 
0.293
***
 
(0.0545) 
0.0561’ 
(0.0288) 
0.146
*
 
(0.0581) 
ird x R&D cooperation with 
same enterprise domestic 
-0.00134 
(0.00186) 
-0.0153
***
 
(0.00319) 
-0.00739
**
 
(0.00285) 
-0.00795
*
 
(0.00369) 
R&D cooperation horizontal -0.0304 
(0.0309) 
-0.122
***
 
(0.0369) 
-0.00868 
(0.0250) 
-0.0645 
(0.0459) 
ird x R&D cooperation 
horizontal 
-0.000675 
(0.00239) 
0.00791
*
 
(0.00394) 
0.00404 
(0.00250) 
0.00511 
(0.0042) 
R&D cooperation vertical 0.0359
**
 
(0.0135) 
0.267
***
 
(0.0469) 
0.0472
*
 
(0.0219) 
0.256
***
 
(0.0492) 
ird x R&D cooperation 
vertical 
-0.000296 
(0.00121) 
-0.0069
*
 
(0.00296) 
-0.00156 
(0.00234) 
-0.00832
**
 
(0.0033) 
R&D cooperation 
institutional 
0.0171 
(0.0178) 
0.182
***
 
(0.0498) 
-0.0171 
(0.0226) 
0.152
**
 
(0.0513) 
ird x R&D cooperation 
institutional 
-0.000515 
(0.00147) 
-0.0113
***
 
(0.00318) 
0.0000227 
(0.00226) 
-0.00895
**
 
(0.0034) 
Sales 
 
-0.00475 
(0.00332) 
-0.00347 
(0.00333) 
-0.00193 
(0.00242) 
-0.00119 
(0.00313) 
Constant 
 
0.107’ 
(0.0608) 
-2.213
***
  
(0.326) 
0.0573 
(0.0448) 
-1.507
***
 
(0.429) 
Industry dummies  Included  Included 
Year dummies Included Included Included Included 
R
2 
(pseudo R
2
 for probit) 0.1913 0.3446 0.1921 0.3138 
N 9,535 9,570 6,217 6,241 
 ‘ significant at 10%, * significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%, and *** significant at 0.1%. Standard errors in 
parentheses. Novel sales is the sale revenue of new products in percent of total sales. Innovation is dummy 
taking 1 if the firm has made a product or process innovation, and 0 otherwise. Internal and external R&D are 
log of R&D expenditures in 2009 NOK. R&D cooperation is dummies, taking 1 if cooperation and 0 otherwise. 
Sales are log of sales in 2009 NOK. Probit estimates are marginal effects calculated from mean values of 
explanatory variables. For dummies, marginal effects describe changes from 0 to 1 in variable. All regressions 
ran in STATA software. Manufacturers also include fishing, mining, energy and construction sectors. 
 
Regarding R&D cooperation, the results differ somewhat in size and between manufacturers 
and services. R&D cooperation with a foreign firm within the same enterprise, affects the 
ratio of new sales to total sales for large firms and services only. The coefficient indicates 
that entering R&D cooperation with a foreign firm within the same enterprise increases the 
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ratio by 13.6 and 5.97 percentage points for large firms and services respectively.  The 
likelihood of innovation is significantly and positively affected by multinational R&D 
cooperation for all firm sizes. The effect is strongest for the large firms in our sample. For 
large firms, multinational R&D cooperation has a significant negative effect on the marginal 
effect of internal R&D on innovativeness. Entering an R&D cooperative with a foreign firm 
within the same enterprise, should turn the marginal effect of R&D on the share of sales 
attributed to new products negative, and reduces the same effect by a half with respect to the 
likelihood of innovating. A substitutable relationship between multinational R&D 
cooperation and internal R&D activity with respect to the likelihood of innovating is also 
found for medium sized firms and services. The substitutable relationship indicates the 
marginal effect of internal R&D to be reduced by a fourth for medium sized firms and a third 
for services. 
R&D cooperation with a domestic firm within the same enterprise increases the likelihood of 
innovation for all subsamples of firms, and substitutability with internal R&D except for 
large firms is found. The change in innovation likelihood and the effect of substitutability is 
increasing in firm size. Entering an R&D cooperative with a domestic firm within the same 
enterprise increases the likelihood of innovating by 16.3, 23.4 and 23.5 percentage points for 
small, medium sized and large firms respectively. For manufacturers and services the same 
effects are 29.3 and 14.6 percentage points respectively. The reduction in the marginal effect 
on innovation due to internal R&D is approximately a third for small and medium sized 
firms, a half for manufacturers, and a third for services. R&D cooperation with a domestic 
firm within the same enterprise is found significantly substitutable with internal R&D with 
respect to share of sales attributed to new products for small firms and services. Entering the 
cooperative should turn the marginal effect of internal R&D with respect to share of new 
sales negative. No direct effect on share of new sales is found for small firms when entering 
an R&D cooperative with a domestic firm within the same enterprise, but a positive effect is 
found for services. 
R&D cooperation with competitors has a significant effect on the probability of innovating 
for small firms and manufacturers. The same effect is found for small firms with respect to 
new sales. The effect is negative, while there is evidence for complementarity with internal 
R&D with respect to the likelihood of innovating.  
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R&D cooperation with customers and suppliers are positively affecting the probability of 
innovating for all firm sizes, and for both manufacturers and services. The effect is strongest 
for small firms. Entering a vertical R&D cooperative increases the probability with 34.2, 
21.1 and 28.3 percentage points for the average small, medium sized and large firms 
respectively. The effect is quite similar for manufacturers and services, 26.7 and 25.6 
respectively. There is evidence for weak substitutability between vertical R&D cooperation 
and internal R&D in the likelihood of innovating for all but large firms. New sales are 
positively affected by vertical R&D cooperation for all subsamples of firms except large 
firms. The effect is stronger for small firms relative to medium sized firms, and 
approximately the same for manufacturers and services. No evidence for substitutability with 
internal R&D with respect to new sales is found. 
Institutional R&D cooperation positively affects the likelihood of innovating for small firms 
and medium sized firms, and for both manufacturers and services. The likelihood increases 
with 23.3 and 12.3 percentage points after entering an institutional R&D cooperative for the 
average small and medium sized firm respectively. For the average manufacturer, the 
increase is 18.2 percentage points, and for the average service firm 15.2 percentage points. 
There is evidence for substitutability with internal R&D for small firms, and for 
manufacturers and services. The substitutability is reducing the marginal return on 
innovation of internal R&D by approximately a third for both services and manufacturers. 
For small firms this reduction is almost 50 percent.  
Overall, the OLS and probit results are more frequently significant than the FE results. 
Confirming presence of unobserved heterogeneity, the FE results for the share of new sales 
attributed to new products proves more robust than the OLS results. The probit results for 
the likelihood of making innovation do not correct for unobserved heterogeneity. However, 
one should note that the likelihood of innovating includes process innovations as well as 
product innovations. Hence, the probit results take a much broader measure of 
innovativeness into account than the FE results, as described in section 4.3. As the frequency 
of innovating was very high for the R&D active firms in the sample, described in chapter 1, 
one might naturally expect a stronger relationship between R&D activities and innovation. 
There is enough observations of cooperation dummies with variation to identify the 
cooperation coefficients. Number of observations with variation in the dummies is given in 
the table with descriptive statistics in appendix B. 
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4.5 Conclusion 
A short summary and some short conclusions can be drawn. No increase in internal R&D 
due to R&D contracting or R&D cooperation with a foreign firm within the same enterprise, 
as well as only a slightly higher level of innovativeness was observed prior to our estimation. 
Not surprisingly we found evidence for foreign R&D inflow within the multinational 
enterprises to be substitutable with internal R&D for Norwegian multinationals. 
For external R&D contracting other than purchases from within multinational enterprises, we 
observed a positive effect on internal R&D. Estimations in this chapter indicate a 
complementary relationship with this non-multinational R&D contracting and internal R&D.  
The theory chapter discussed how different forms of R&D cooperation to have different 
impact in R&D activity. After splitting up the cooperation variable, we found horizontal, 
vertical and institutional R&D cooperation to affect internal R&D, and also innovativeness, 
differently. A further discussion of the results is given in the next chapter. 
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5. Discussion and conclusion 
 
5.1 Discussion 
 
R&D purchases from foreign firms within the same enterprise 
Across both firm sizes and firm sectors, internal R&D has a stronger impact than external 
R&D purchased from a foreign firm within the same enterprise on innovativeness. 
Norwegian firms benefit from acquiring R&D from abroad through their multinational 
linkage with respect to innovation likelihood. This holds for both manufacturers and 
services, as well as for small and medium sized firms.  
There is strong evidence for external R&D purchased from enterprises abroad to be 
substitutable with internal R&D. A ten percent increase in such external R&D purchases 
reduces, ceteris paribus, the marginal effect of internal R&D on innovativeness by 
approximately a third. The results from section 3 showed that multinational firms neither 
increase nor decrease their internal R&D expenditures after such purchases, which is not in 
accordance with the findings of Bandick et. al. (2010), Bertrand (2009), and Bertrand et. al. 
(2008). They find internal R&D in newly acquired subsidiaries to be increased post foreign 
acquisition. The results may be attributed to several factors. Norwegian parent companies 
may invest in subsidiaries abroad in order to both augment and exploit the knowledge stock 
of the subsidiary (Kuemmerle, 1999). Inflow of technology and knowledge from foreign 
subsidiaries may reduce the need for performing R&D internally at home for parent 
companies with sufficient absorptive capacity. 
For Norwegian subsidiaries, the results may be somewhat surprising, given the relatively 
strong patent protection and the high skilled workforce, favouring R&D investment in 
Norway. However, the high proportion of high skilled workers is able to absorb R&D 
spillovers and may hence reduce the attractiveness of conducting R&D in Norwegian 
subsidiaries (Ekholm and Hakkala, 2007). Norwegian firms, and perhaps especially 
multinationals conducting R&D, may for similar reasons have high levels of absorptive 
capacity, reducing the need of increasing internal R&D when buying R&D (Ito and 
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Wakasugi, 2007; Erken and Kleijn, 2010). The high skilled workforce may also ease transfer 
of R&D from abroad to Norwegian subsidiaries, favouring R&D specialization in parent 
companies abroad (Belderbos et. al., 2008).  
The results for multinational firms may also be directly attributed to consequences of 
mergers or acquisition. High reorganization costs may reduce the capability of conducting 
R&D itself, favouring contracting out R&D (Lei and Hitt, 1995). M&A may also alter the 
market structure, reducing the incentives of conducting R&D in order to capture market 
shares (Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1980; Blundell et. al., 1999).  
 
R&D purchases from other firms 
The negative effect of R&D purchases on the likelihood of innovation, at least for medium 
sized and large firms, and manufacturers, as well as the insignificant impact on the 
innovativeness of small firms and services, is somewhat puzzling. Taking the findings of 
complementarity into consideration, as well as the considerable increase in internal R&D 
due to such R&D contracting, firms may not buy R&D in order to acquire specific 
innovations, but rather to access knowledge and technology in general. At a later stage, after 
processing the acquired knowledge and technology – which involves internal R&D – 
innovations occur. At this stage, the innovations are attributed to internal R&D, and not the 
external R&D. The considerable increase in internal R&D related to external R&D sourcing 
is in line with the findings of Veugelers (1997), who finds support for complementarity 
between internal R&D and external R&D sources for firms with internal R&D departments. 
Taking the evidence of complementarity between internal and external R&D into 
consideration as well, our results are in accordance with the findings of Hagedoorn and 
Wang (2010) and Belderbos et. al. (2008). However, the negative effect on the 
innovativeness is in conflict with most other empirics. 
 
R&D cooperation with foreign firms within the same enterprise 
We have found a positive impact of R&D cooperation with a foreign firm within the same 
enterprise on the likelihood of making innovations as well as evidence of substitutability 
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with internal R&D. These results suggest that international collaborations for Norwegian 
multinationals results in innovations but reduce the innovativeness of internal R&D, and 
may be due to displacement of internal R&D resources into international collaboration, to 
which the innovation is attributed. Hence, foreign R&D collaboration within the enterprise 
may be considered a substitute for (the non-absorptive capacity part of) internal R&D. 
 
R&D cooperation with a domestic firm within the same enterprise 
We find weak evidence for a positive effect on internal R&D following the decision to 
engage in R&D cooperation with domestic firms in the same enterprise. This linkage turns 
out to be positive only for medium sized firms and for service firms at an aggregated level. 
In all cases we find increased probabilities for innovations, but substitutability between the 
cooperation strategy and internal R&D except for large firms.  One possible explanation for 
these findings may be the persistency of the cooperation strategy, with synergy effects 
converging towards zero as time passes. With no synergy effects and costs of sustaining the 
cooperation, conducting own R&D or contracting out R&D in an isolated fashion may be 
more profitable for the firms.  
  
Horizontal R&D cooperation 
The probability of innovating decreases by engaging in horizontal cooperation at the 
aggregated level, as well as for small firms and manufacturing firms. We also find this R&D 
strategy to stimulate investments in internal R&D, for all samples except the large firms. 
Despite the negative effect on innovation activity we find evidence suggesting 
complementarity between internal R&D and horizontal cooperation.  
We cannot differentiate between intra-industry and inter-industry cooperation. Regarding 
intra-industry cooperation, i.e. firms competing with imperfect substitutes or complements, 
our results are in line with predictions from Katz (1986) suggesting increased investments in 
R&D following horizontal cooperation. In the case of inter-industry cooperation our results 
can be attributed to internalization of spillovers (D’Aspremont & Jacquemin, 1988). 
However this requires certain levels of R&D spillovers prior to the cooperation (De Bondt & 
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Veugelers, 1991) and a low level of R&D spillovers within the cooperative (Kamen et al., 
1992; Kaiser, 2002). Internalization of R&D spillovers is thought to increase the efficiency 
of internal R&D, hence facilitating complementarity. 
Horizontal cooperation may reduce competition in the output market (e.g. Dasgupta & 
Stiglitz, 1980) given homogenous products (Katz, 1986). However, we do not expect this 
effect to a large extent in Norway because horizontal cooperation between firms with 
significant market power are prohibited by law (EU Commission Regulation, 2010). 
Our results are in line with the findings of Inkmann (2000). 
 
Vertical R&D cooperation 
Cooperation with suppliers and customers are found to significantly increase the probability 
of innovation in all cases, as well as increasing the contribution to total sales attributable to 
new or improved products for all but large firms. As for the test of complementarity our 
results points towards vertical R&D cooperation to be a substitute for internal R&D 
regarding innovation except for large firms, where the results are inconclusive.  
It seems reasonable to assume that process innovations are favored by cooperation with 
suppliers, whereas product innovations are favored by cooperation with customers (von 
Hippel, 1988; Tether, 2002; Belderbos et al., 2004). Cost reduction is expected to be one of 
the main motives for engaging in vertical R&D cooperation (Belderbos et al., 2004; Lopéz, 
2008), due to i.a. risk sharing between the participants in the co-op (Kawasaki and 
McMillan, 1987; Asanuma and Kikutani, 1992). In the case of lacking appropriability, 
vertical cooperation may lead to internalization of external R&D spillovers increasing the 
efficiency of internal R&D (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002; Lopéz, 2008). However we 
don’t see lack of appropriability as a severe problem in Norway, thus the cost reduction 
motive may explain the finding of substitutability between vertical R&D cooperation and 
internal R&D. 
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Institutional R&D cooperation 
For small and medium sized firms, manufacturing and service firms, and the full sample the 
coefficient for institutional R&D cooperation suggests a positive effect on the probability of 
innovating. Internal R&D cooperation and internal R&D are found to be substitutes for all 
subsamples except for medium sized and large firms. 
The estimated increase in internal R&D following R&D cooperation with institutions can be 
ascribed to the need for absorptive capacity (Cockburn and Henderson, 1997), or the fact that 
R&D intensive firms have a higher propensity to cooperate with universities and research 
institutions (Belderbos et al., 2004).  
Institutional R&D cooperation will provide firms with leading technology, in particular 
technology laggards, increasing the innovativeness of the laggards (Monjon and Waelbrock, 
2003). Universities is also seen as a less costly way of acquiring technology for firms lacking 
financial muscles and the possibility to conduct own R&D (Tether, 2002), making 
institutional R&D cooperation substitutable with internal R&D. These conditions are more 
likely to be met for small firms as opposed to medium sized or large firms, which have easier 
access to capital, in accordance with our results.   
 
5.2 Conclusion 
 
In the introduction we noted that multinational enterprises have grown in importance the 
recent decades. Questions have been raised about the impact of foreign ownership on 
domestic R&D investment. Multinational firms were thought to access foreign R&D easier, 
but at the aggregate level there was no sign of increased inflow of foreign R&D through 
multinational enterprises into Norway during the last decade. We found no clear evidence for 
R&D purchases from foreign firms within the same enterprise to increase internal R&D 
expenditures; when controlling for other forms of external R&D purchases and R&D 
cooperation, the impact of foreign R&D through multinational enterprises on internal R&D 
expenditures among Norwegian multinationals were insignificant. The same results were 
found for R&D cooperation with a foreign firm within the same enterprise. As discussed in 
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the theory section, and noted throughout chapter 3 and 4, absorptive capacity seem to be a 
driver for increased internal R&D activity when sourcing R&D externally. Modelling 
internal and different forms of external R&D as inputs in the innovation process, we found 
interesting evidence for substitutability between multinational R&D sourcing and internal 
R&D. As discussed in the introduction to chapter 4, a substitutable relationship between 
internal and external R&D and the need for absorptive capacity have contrary effects on 
internal R&D; the substitutable relationship affects internal R&D negatively, while 
absorptive capacity increases internal R&D when sourcing externally. The insignificant 
effect of multinational R&D ties on internal R&D may then be due to a counterbalancing of 
the substitutable relationship and absorptive capacity effects. Hence for initially high levels 
of internal R&D, multinational R&D sourcing should reduce internal R&D among 
Norwegian multinationals. 
Significant positive effects on internal R&D expenditures were found for other forms of 
external R&D purchases and R&D cooperation. Firms with non-multinational R&D ties 
were seen to perform on average less internal R&D than firms with multinational R&D ties. 
Hence the need for absorptive capacity should be more precarious for these firms than for 
firms with multinational R&D ties. In chapter 4, we found evidence for a complementary 
relationship between non-multinational R&D contracting and internal R&D. Hence, the need 
for absorptive capacity as well as the complementary relationship seems to drive the positive 
relationship between internal R&D and non-multinational external R&D expenditures. The 
need for absorptive capacity is also found to be prevalent for the relationship between R&D 
cooperation and internal R&D expenditures, also for vertical and institutional R&D 
cooperation which were found substitutable with internal R&D activity.  
As final remarks we will point out three important implications of our results. The need for 
absorptive capacity seems to be a driver for the increase in internal R&D due to external 
R&D activity. However, for high levels of internal R&D, absorptive capacity is present, and 
complementary and substitutable properties of internal and external R&D seem to be the 
underlying drivers for the impact of the latter on internal R&D expenditures.  
Multinational R&D ties do not seem to stimulate internal R&D investment among 
Norwegian multinationals. Quite the opposite; disregarding the need for absorptive capacity, 
e.g. for high levels of internal R&D which is the case for most multinationals, multinational 
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R&D ties seem to have substitutable properties with internal R&D, making multinational 
R&D sources displace domestic internal R&D activity.  
Other forms of external R&D sources do seem to stimulate domestic internal R&D 
investment. For other external R&D purchases, this is the case also beyond the need for 
absorptive capacity due to the complementary relationship with internal R&D. Regarding 
vertical and institutional R&D cooperation, the need for absorptive capacity seems to drive a 
positive relationship despite of a an underlying substitutable relationship with internal R&D. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Variable list chapter 3 
 
Full sample 
 mean sd N Median Transitions 
ird 4.585 6.933 39909 0  
erd 2.530 5.386 40169 0  
merd 0.362 2.264 32418 0  
oerd 0.509 2.674 32418 0  
CO 0.170 0.376 37925 0 2327 
MCO 0.040 0.195 37925 0 609 
DCO 0.044 0.205 37925 0 887 
HCO 0.061 0.239 27793 0 825 
VCO 0.136 0.343 27793 0 1537 
ICO 0.113 0.316 37925 0 1733 
 
Small firms 
 mean sd N Median Transitions 
ird 3.730 6.383 20150 0  
erd 1.631 4.359 20297 0  
merd 0.152 1.433 17486 0  
oerd 0.254 1.834 17486 0  
CO 0.123 0.328 19469 0 1069 
MCO 0.018 0.131 19469 0 181 
DCO 0.024 0.154 19469 0 302 
HCO 0.042 0.202 14549 0 325 
VCO 0.104 0.305 14549 0 676 
ICO 0.076 0.264 19469 0 759 
 
Medium firms 
 mean sd N Median Transitions 
ird 4.924 7.040 15604 0  
erd 2.882 5.617 15687 0  
merd 0.388 2.315 12142 0  
oerd 0.536 2.709 12142 0  
CO 0.189 0.391 14655 0 957 
MCO 0.045 0.208 14655 0 280 
DCO 0.047 0.211 14655 0 388 
HCO 0.068 0.252 10561 0 336 
VCO 0.146 0.354 10561 0 627 
ICO 0.123 0.328 14655 0 724 
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Large firms 
 mean sd N Median Transitions 
ird 7.464 8.106 4155 0  
erd 5.570 7.377 4185 0  
merd 1.562 4.652 2790 0  
oerd 1.998 5.238 2790 0  
CO 0.343 0.475 3801 0 302 
MCO 0.130 0.337 3801 0 139 
DCO 0.133 0.340 3801 0 189 
HCO 0.135 0.341 2683 0 144 
VCO 0.271 0.445 2683 0 203 
ICO 0.264 0.441 3801 0 267 
 
Produsenter 
 mean sd N Median Transitions 
ird 4.850 6.993 25201 0  
erd 2.915 5.642 25400 0  
merd 0.414 2.417 19948 0  
oerd 0.622 2.937 19948 0  
CO 0.186 0.389 24039 0 1497 
MCO 0.044 0.205 24039 0 380 
DCO 0.048 0.214 24039 0 580 
HCO 0.069 0.254 17483 0 576 
VCO 0.146 0.353 17483 0 981 
ICO 0.127 0.333 24039 0 1166 
 
Service 
 mean sd N Median Transitions 
ird 4.133 6.806 14708 0  
erd 1.867 4.844 14769 0  
merd 0.279 1.992 12470 0  
oerd 0.329 2.175 12470 0  
CO 0.144 0.351 13886 0 811 
MCO 0.032 0.176 13886 0 225 
DCO 0.037 0.188 13886 0 306 
HCO 0.047 0.212 10310 0         242 
VCO 0.120 0.325 10310 0 533 
ICO 0.088 0.284 13886 0 561 
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Appendix B: Variable list chapter 4 
 
 
Full sample 
 mean sd N Median Transitions 
innovasjon 0.331 0.471 21704 0  
turnin 0.084 0.194 19598 0  
ird3 5.350 7.105 39943 0  
erd3 3.343 5.849 40171 0  
merd3 0.525 2.667 35875 0  
oerd3 0.414 1.723 35875 0  
CO3 0.234 0.423 39383 0 2031 
irdCO3 2.994 6.038 39154 0  
MCO3 0.061 0.240 39643 0 550 
irdMCO3 0.894 3.676 39414 0  
DCO3 0.074 0.263 39643 0 799 
irdDCO3 1.001 3.810 39414 0  
HCO3 0.094 0.292 31378 0 739 
irdHCO3 1.287 4.265 31374 0  
VCO3 0.197 0.398 31378 0 1239 
irdVCO3 2.615 5.762 31374 0  
ICO3 0.175 0.380 39643 0 1461 
irdICO3 2.419 5.584 39414 0  
sale3 18.098 2.154 37785 18.069  
N 40172     
 
Small firms 
 mean sd N Median Transitions 
innovasjon 0.294 0.456 11329 0.000  
turnin 0.092 0.210 10273 0.000  
ird3 4.304 6.612 20171 0.000  
erd3 2.174 4.835 20297 0.000  
merd3 0.222 1.707 18526 0.000  
oerd3 0.201 1.144 18526 0.000  
CO3 0.164 0.371 19873 0.000 936 
irdCO3 2.076 5.136 19746 0.000  
MCO3 0.028 0.166 19944 0.000 161 
irdMCO3 0.396 2.432 19817 0.000  
DCO3 0.038 0.192 19944 0.000 260 
irdDCO3 0.491 2.663 19817 0.000  
HCO3 0.064 0.244 15605 0.000 264 
irdHCO3 0.837 3.429 15602 0.000  
VCO3 0.147 0.354 15605 0.000 519 
irdVCO3 1.923 5.001 15602 0.000  
ICO3 0.116 0.321 19944 0.000 613 
irdICO3 1.576 4.583 19817 0.000  
sale3 17.001 1.855 18415 17.068  
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Medium sized firms 
 mean sd N Median Transitions 
innovasjon 0.350 0.477 8168 0.000  
turnin 0.074 0.173 7381 0.000  
ird3 5.869 7.179 15613 0.000  
erd3 3.912 6.085 15687 0.000  
merd3 0.563 2.718 13919 0.000  
oerd3 0.441 1.726 13919 0.000  
CO3 0.267 0.442 15407 0.000 876 
irdCO3 3.340 6.236 15333 0.000  
MCO3 0.072 0.259 15545 0.000 267 
irdMCO3 1.012 3.846 15471 0.000  
DCO3 0.085 0.279 15545 0.000 369 
irdDCO3 1.079 3.884 15471 0.000  
HCO3 0.107 0.309 12424 0.000 332 
irdHCO3 1.435 4.435 12423 0.000  
VCO3 0.218 0.413 12424 0.000 552 
irdVCO3 2.791 5.857 12423 0.000  
ICO3 0.198 0.398 15545 0.000 630 
irdICO3 2.668 5.752 15471 0.000  
sale3 18.778 1.671 15291 18.759  
 
Large firms 
 mean sd N Median Transitions 
innovasjon 0.456 0.498 2207 0.000  
turnin 0.082 0.176 1944 0.000  
ird3 8.470 7.954 4159 12.824  
erd3 6.883 7.469 4187 0.000  
merd3 2.014 5.095 3430 0.000  
oerd3 1.457 3.252 3430 0.000  
CO3 0.444 0.497 4103 0.000 261 
irdCO3 6.139 7.859 4075 0.000  
MCO3 0.180 0.384 4154 0.000 123 
irdMCO3 2.848 6.336 4126 0.000  
DCO3 0.208 0.406 4154 0.000 169 
irdDCO3 3.154 6.493 4126 0.000  
HCO3 0.190 0.392 3349 0.000 140 
irdHCO3 2.833 6.263 3349 0.000  
VCO3 0.357 0.479 3349 0.000 156 
irdVCO3 5.180 7.642 3349 0.000  
ICO3 0.370 0.483 4154 0.000 208 
irdICO3 5.529 7.725 4126 0.000  
sale3 20.506 1.998 4079 20.596  
 
Produsenter 
 mean sd N Median Transitions 
innovasjon 0.354 0.478 13595 0.000  
turnin 0.078 0.179 12129 0.000  
ird3 5.665 7.130 25224 0.000  
erd3 3.789 6.038 25402 0.000  
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merd3 0.595 2.830 22290 0.000  
oerd3 0.496 1.869 22290 0.000  
CO3 0.254 0.435 24939 0.000 1297 
irdCO3 3.312 6.245 24760 0.000  
MCO3 0.067 0.250 25101 0.000 346 
irdMCO3 1.018 3.898 24922 0.000  
DCO3 0.081 0.274 25101 0.000 526 
irdDCO3 1.116 4.005 24922 0.000  
HCO3 0.107 0.309 19770 0.000 522 
irdHCO3 1.470 4.514 19768 0.000  
VCO3 0.211 0.408 19770 0.000 802 
irdVCO3 2.864 5.952 19768 0.000  
ICO3 0.196 0.397 25101 0.000 986 
irdICO3 2.740 5.851 24922 0.000  
sale3 18.147 1.850 23751 18.076  
 
Service 
 mean sd N Median Transitions 
innovasjon 0.293 0.455 8109 0.000  
turnin 0.093 0.215 7469 0.000  
ird3 4.809 7.028 14719 0.000  
erd3 2.576 5.422 14769 0.000  
merd3 0.411 2.369 13585 0.000  
oerd3 0.280 1.443 13585 0.000  
CO3 0.199 0.399 14444 0.000 734 
irdCO3 2.446 5.624 14394 0.000  
MCO3 0.051 0.221 14542 0.000 196 
irdMCO3 0.682 3.248 14492 0.000  
DCO3 0.063 0.242 14542 0.000 274 
irdDCO3 0.803 3.441 14492 0.000  
HCO3 0.073 0.260 11608 0.000 210 
irdHCO3 0.975 3.783 11606 0.000  
VCO3 0.174 0.379 11608 0.000 421 
irdVCO3 2.191 5.397 11606 0.000  
ICO3 0.138 0.345 14542 0.000 459 
irdICO3 1.865 5.045 14492 0.000  
sale3 18.016 2.586 14034 18.060  
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Appendix C: Do file 
 
*Section 1 - Merging the yearly data 
 
*Destring and compress 
use f1997_multi 
destring _all, replace 
gen aargang = 1999 
compress _all 
save 1999 
 
use f1999_multi 
gen aargang = 2000 
destring _all, replace 
compress _all 
save 2000 
 
use f2001_multi 
destring _all, replace 
compress _all 
save 2001 
 
use f2002_multi 
destring _all, replace 
compress _all 
save 2002 
 
use f2003_multi 
destring _all, replace 
compress _all 
save 2003 
 
use f2004_multi 
destring _all, replace 
compress _all 
save 2004 
 
use f2005_multi 
drop rdepint 
destring _all, replace 
compress _all 
save 2005 
 
*marloc and mareur are dummies representing the markets where the firm sell its products 
use f2006_multi 
destring _all, replace 
compress _all 
drop marloc 
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drop mareur 
drop oekreg 
save 2006 
 
use f2007_multi 
drop rdepint 
destring _all, replace 
compress _all 
save 2007 
 
use f2008_multi 
destring _all, replace 
compress _all 
save 2008 
 
use f2009_multi 
destring _all, replace 
compress _all 
save 2009 
 
*Merge data sets 
clear 
append using 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
sort frtk_id aargang 
egen id = group(frtk_id) 
save fou 
clear 
 
 
***PART 2: CLEANING UP THE DATASET*** 
 
use fou 
 
*2.1: CORRECTING FOR DIFFERENT NAMES OF IDENTICAL VARIABLES 
*nace1 
replace nace1 = nace1_sn07 if (aargang == 2008 | aargang == 2009) 
  
*cooperation 
replace samarb = co if (missing(samarb) & co != .) 
 
*Year 
replace aargang = 2007 if missing(aargang) 
 
*sales 
replace omsetning = oms_rev if (aargang == 2008 | aargang == 2007 | aargang == 2006 | 
aargang == 2005 | aargang == 2003 | aargang == 2002 | aargang == 2001)  
replace omsetning = oms if (aargang == 1999 | aargang == 2000)  
 
*Value generated by new products weighted by sales 
replace turnin = no_turnin if (missing(turnin) & no_turnin != .) 
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replace turnin = turnnew if (missing(turnin) & turnnew != .) 
 
*Other operational costs associated with R&D 
replace adk = adkost if (adk == . & (aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2007 | aargang == 2008 | 
aargang == 2009)) 
 
 
*2.2: REMOVING MISSING VALUES WHERE POSSIBLE 
 
*Utfrt: If utfrt (dummy on performing rd or not) is missing, but intfou (sum of internal rd 
expenditures) is positive, utfrt is replaced with 1. 
replace utfrt = 1 if (missing(utfrt) & intfou > 0 & intfou != .) 
replace utfrt = 1 if utfrt == 2 
replace utfrt = 0 if intfou == 0 
 
*Bought r&d: If finan (dummy on buying or not buying external rd) is missing, but if sum of 
external rd expenditures (xdkskn, xdksku etc) is positive, finan is replaced with 1. 
*The sum of extrenal rd expenditures are set to 0 if the firm has reported no external rd 
bought (finan=0) and the external rd expenditures are missing. 
replace finan = 1 if ((xdkskn != . & xdkskn != 0) | (xdksku != . & xdksku != 0) | (xdkakn != . 
& xdkakn != 0) | (xdkauf != . & xdkauf != 0) | (xdkain != . & xdkain != 0) | (xdkuin != . & 
xdkuin != 0) | (xdkuhn != . & xdkuhn != 0) | (xdkfok != . & xdkfok != 0) | (xdkuhu != . & 
xdkuhu != 0) | (gave != . & gave != 0) | (xdkfor != . & xdkfor != 0) | (xdkfuhn != . & 
xdkfuhn != 0) | (xdkfuhu != . & xdkfuhu != 0) | (xdkfuh != . & xdkfuh != 0) | (xdkoff != . & 
xdkoff != 0) | (xdkeu != . & xdkeu != 0) | (xdkfon != . & xdkfon != 0) | (xdkutl != . & xdkutl 
!= 0) | (xdk != . & xdk != 0)) 
replace finan = 0 if missing(finan) 
replace xdksku = 0 if (missing(xdksku) & finan == 0 & aargang != 2002) 
replace xdk = 0 if (missing(xdk) & finan == 0) 
 
*Sum of internal r&d expenditures 
replace intfou = 0 if (missing(intfou) & utfrt == 0) 
 
 
*Cooperation variables: same variables with different names in some years are combined. 
replace saminnn = 1 if (saminnn >= 1 & saminnn != . & (aargang == 1999 | aargang == 
2000)) 
replace saminnno = 1 if (saminnno >= 1 & saminnno != . & (aargang == 1999 | aargang == 
2000)) 
replace saminneu = 1 if (saminneu >= 1 & saminneu != . & (aargang == 1999 | aargang == 
2000)) 
replace saminnan = 1 if (saminnan >= 1 & saminnan != . & (aargang == 1999 | aargang == 
2000)) 
replace samforn = 1 if (samforn >= 1 & samforn != . & (aargang == 1999 | aargang == 
2000)) 
replace samforno = 1 if (samforno >= 1 & samforno != . & (aargang == 1999 | aargang == 
2000)) 
replace samforeu = 1 if (samforeu >= 1 & samforeu != . & (aargang == 1999 | aargang == 
2000)) 
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replace samforan = 1 if (samforan >= 1 & samforan != . & (aargang == 1999 | aargang == 
2000)) 
replace samuohn = 1 if (samuohn >= 1 & samuohn != . & (aargang == 1999 | aargang == 
2000)) 
replace samuohno = 1 if (samuohno >= 1 & samuohno != . & (aargang == 1999 | aargang == 
2000)) 
replace samuoheu = 1 if (samuoheu >= 1 & samuoheu != . & (aargang == 1999 | aargang == 
2000)) 
replace samuohan = 1 if (samuohan >= 1 & samuohan != . & (aargang == 1999 | aargang == 
2000)) 
replace samannn = 1 if (samannn >= 1 & samannn != . & (aargang == 1999 | aargang == 
2000)) 
replace samannno = 1 if (samannno >= 1 & samannno != . & (aargang == 1999 | aargang == 
2000)) 
replace samanneu = 1 if (samanneu >= 1 & samanneu != . & (aargang == 1999 | aargang == 
2000)) 
replace samannan = 1 if (samannan >= 1 & samannan != . & (aargang == 1999 | aargang == 
2000)) 
 
replace samarb = 1 if (samuohn == 1 | samuohno == 1 | samuoheu == 1 | samuohan == 1 | 
samforn == 1 | samforno == 1 | samforeu == 1 | samforan == 1 | saminnn == 1 | saminnno == 
1 | saminneu == 1 | saminnan == 1 | samannn == 1 | samannno == 1 | samanneu == 1 | 
samannan == 1 | saminnreg == 1 | samannreg == 1 | samforreg == 1 | samuohreg == 1 | 
saminn == 1 | saminnusa == 1 | samlevn == 1 | samlevno == 1 | samleveu == 1 | samlevusa 
== 1 | samlevan == 1 | samkunn == 1 | samkunno == 1 | samkuneu == 1 | samkunusa == 1 | 
samkunan == 1 | samkonkn == 1 | samkonkno == 1 | samkonkeu == 1 | samkonkusa == 1 | 
samkonkan == 1 | samkonsn == 1 | samkonsno == 1 | samkonseu == 1 | samkonsusa == 1 | 
samkonsan == 1 | samkomn == 1 | samkomno == 1 | samkomeu == 1 | samkomusa == 1 | 
samkoman == 1 | samunin == 1 | samunino == 1 | samunieu == 1 | samuniusa == 1 | 
samunian == 1 | samoffn == 1 | samoffno == 1 | samoffeu == 1 | samoffusa == 1 | samoffan 
== 1 | co11 == 1 | co12 == 1 | co13 == 1 | co14 == 1 | co15 == 1 | co16 == 1 | co17 == 1 | 
co18 == 1 | co19 == 1 | co21 == 1 | co22 == 1 | co23 == 1 | co24 == 1 | co25 == 1 | co26 == 
1 | co27 == 1 | co28 == 1 | co29 == 1 | co31 == 1 | co32 == 1 | co33 == 1 | co34 == 1 | co35 
== 1 | co36 == 1 | co37 == 1 | co38 == 1 | co39 == 1 | co41 == 1 | co42 == 1 | co43 == 1 | 
co44 == 1 | co45 == 1 | co46 == 1 | co47 == 1 | co48 == 1 | co49 == 1 | co51 == 1 | co52 == 
1 | co53 == 1 | co54 == 1 | co55 == 1 | co56 == 1 | co57 == 1 | co58 == 1 | co59 == 1 | co61 
== 1 | co62 == 1 | co63 == 1 | co64 == 1 | co65 == 1 | co66 == 1 | co67 == 1 | co68 == 1 | 
co69 == 1 | co71 == 1 | co72 == 1 | co73 == 1 | co74 == 1 | co75 == 1 | co76 == 1 | co77 == 
1 | co78 == 1 | co79 == 1 | co81 == 1 | co82 == 1 | co83 == 1 | co84 == 1 | co85 == 1 | co86 
== 1 | co87 == 1 | co88 == 1 | co89 == 1 | no_co12 == 1 | no_co22 == 1 | no_co32 == 1 | 
no_co42 == 1 | no_co51 == 1 | no_co52 == 1 | no_co53 == 1 | no_co54 == 1 | no_co61 == 1 
| no_co62 == 1 | no_co63 == 1 | no_co64 == 1 | no_co71 == 1 | no_co72 == 1 | no_co73 == 
1 | no_co74 == 1) 
replace samarb = 0 if (missing(samarb) & aargang != 2002) 
 
 replace co11 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & co11 == . & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2004 | 
aargang == 2005)) 
 replace co12 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & co12 == . & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2005 | 
aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2008)) 
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 replace co13 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & co13 == . & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2004 | 
aargang == 2005)) 
 replace co14 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & co14 == . & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2004 | 
aargang == 2005 | aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2008)) 
 replace co15 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & co15 == . & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2008)) 
 replace co16 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & co16 == . & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2006 | 
aargang == 2008)) 
 replace co17 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & co17 == . & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2004 | 
aargang == 2005 | aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2008)) 
 replace co18 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & co18 == . & (aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2008)) 
 replace co19 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & co19 == . & (aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2008)) 
  
 replace co21 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & co21 == . & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2004 | 
aargang == 2005)) 
 replace co22 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & co22 == . & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2005 | 
aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2008)) 
 replace co23 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & co23 == . & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2004 | 
aargang == 2005)) 
 replace co24 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & co24 == . & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2004 | 
aargang == 2005 | aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2008)) 
 replace co25 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & co25 == . & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2008)) 
 replace co26 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & co26 == . & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2006 | 
aargang == 2008)) 
 replace co27 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & co27 == . & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2004 | 
aargang == 2005 | aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2008)) 
 replace co28 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & co28 == . & (aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2008)) 
 replace co29 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & co29 == . & (aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2008)) 
  
 replace co31 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & co31 == . & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2004 | 
aargang == 2005)) 
 replace co32 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & co32 == . & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2005 | 
aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2008)) 
 replace co33 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & co33 == . & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2004 | 
aargang == 2005)) 
 replace co34 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & co34 == . & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2004 | 
aargang == 2005 | aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2008)) 
 replace co35 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & co35 == . & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2008)) 
 replace co36 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & co36 == . & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2006 | 
aargang == 2008)) 
 replace co37 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & co37 == . & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2004 | 
aargang == 2005 | aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2008)) 
 replace co38 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & co38 == . & (aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2008)) 
 replace co39 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & co39 == . & (aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2008)) 
  
 replace co41 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & co41 == . & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2004 | 
aargang == 2005)) 
 replace co42 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & co42 == . & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2005 | 
aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2008)) 
 replace co43 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & co43 == . & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2004 | 
aargang == 2005)) 
 88 
 replace co44 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & co44 == . & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2004 | 
aargang == 2005 | aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2008)) 
 replace co45 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & co45 == . & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2008)) 
 replace co46 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & co46 == . & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2006 | 
aargang == 2008)) 
 replace co47 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & co47 == . & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2004 | 
aargang == 2005 | aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2008)) 
 replace co48 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & co48 == . & (aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2008)) 
 replace co49 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & co49 == . & (aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2008)) 
  
 replace co51 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & co51 == . & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2005)) 
 replace co52 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & co52 == . & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2005 | 
aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2008)) 
 replace co53 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & co53 == . & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2004 | 
aargang == 2005)) 
 replace co54 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & co54 == . & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2004 | 
aargang == 2005 | aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2008)) 
 replace co55 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & co55 == . & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2008)) 
 replace co56 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & co56 == . & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2006 | 
aargang == 2008)) 
 replace co57 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & co57 == . & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2004 | 
aargang == 2005 | aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2008)) 
 replace co58 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & co58 == . & (aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2008)) 
 replace co59 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & co59 == . & (aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2008)) 
  
 replace co61 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & co61 == . & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2005)) 
 replace co62 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & co62 == . & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2005 | 
aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2008)) 
 replace co63 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & co63 == . & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2004 | 
aargang == 2005)) 
 replace co64 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & co64 == . & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2004 | 
aargang == 2005 | aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2008)) 
 replace co65 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & co65 == . & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2008)) 
 replace co66 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & co66 == . & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2006 | 
aargang == 2008)) 
 replace co67 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & co67 == . & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2004 | 
aargang == 2005 | aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2008)) 
 replace co68 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & co68 == . & (aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2008)) 
 replace co69 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & co69 == . & (aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2008)) 
  
 replace co71 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & co71 == . & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2005)) 
 replace co72 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & co72 == . & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2005 | 
aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2008)) 
 replace co73 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & co73 == . & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2005)) 
 replace co74 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & co74 == . & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2005 | 
aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2008)) 
 replace co75 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & co75 == . & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2008)) 
 replace co76 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & co76 == . & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2006 | 
aargang == 2008)) 
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 replace co77 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & co77 == . & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2004 | 
aargang == 2005 | aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2008))  
 replace co78 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & co78 == . & (aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2008)) 
 replace co79 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & co79 == . & (aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2008)) 
  
 replace co81 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & co81 == . & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2004 | 
aargang == 2005)) 
 replace co82 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & co82 == . & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2004 | 
aargang == 2005 | aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2008)) 
 replace co83 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & co83 == . & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2004 | 
aargang == 2005)) 
 replace co84 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & co84 == . & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2004 | 
aargang == 2005 | aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2008)) 
 replace co85 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & co85 == . & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2008)) 
 replace co86 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & co86 == . & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2006 | 
aargang == 2008)) 
 replace co87 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & co87 == . & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2004 | 
aargang == 2005 | aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2008)) 
 replace co88 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & co88 == . & (aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2008)) 
 replace co89 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & co89 == . & (aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2008)) 
  
 replace no_co12 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & no_co12 == . & aargang == 2004) 
 replace no_co22 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & no_co22 == . & aargang == 2004) 
 replace no_co32 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & no_co32 == . & aargang == 2004) 
 replace no_co42 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & no_co42 == . & aargang == 2004) 
 replace no_co52 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & no_co52 == . & aargang == 2004) 
 replace no_co62 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & no_co62 == . & aargang == 2004) 
 replace no_co72 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & no_co72 == . & aargang == 2004) 
 replace no_co71 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & no_co71 == . & aargang == 2004) 
 replace no_co61 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & no_co61 == . & aargang == 2004) 
 replace no_co51 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & no_co51 == . & aargang == 2004) 
 replace no_co53 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & no_co53 == . & aargang == 2004) 
 replace no_co63 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & no_co63 == . & aargang == 2004) 
 replace no_co73 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & no_co73 == . & aargang == 2004) 
 replace no_co54 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & no_co54 == . & aargang == 2004) 
 replace no_co64 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & no_co64 == . & aargang == 2004) 
 replace no_co74 = 0 if (samarb == 0 & no_co74 == . & aargang == 2004) 
  
 replace samuohn = 0 if (samarb == 0 & (aargang == 1999 | aargang == 2000 | aargang == 
2003)) 
 replace samuohno = 0 if (samarb == 0 & (aargang == 1999 | aargang == 2000 | aargang == 
2003)) 
 replace samuoheu = 0 if (samarb == 0 & (aargang == 1999 | aargang == 2000 | aargang == 
2003)) 
 replace samuohan = 0 if (samarb == 0 & (aargang == 1999 | aargang == 2000 | aargang == 
2003)) 
  
 replace samforn = 0 if (samarb == 0 & (aargang == 1999 | aargang == 2000 | aargang == 
2003)) 
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 replace samforno = 0 if (samarb == 0 & (aargang == 1999 | aargang == 2000 | aargang == 
2003)) 
 replace samforeu = 0 if (samarb == 0 & (aargang == 1999 | aargang == 2000 | aargang == 
2003)) 
 replace samforan = 0 if (samarb == 0 & (aargang == 1999 | aargang == 2000 | aargang == 
2003)) 
  
 replace saminnn = 0 if (samarb == 0 & (aargang == 1999 | aargang == 2000 | aargang == 
2003)) 
 replace saminnno = 0 if (samarb == 0 & (aargang == 1999 | aargang == 2000 | aargang == 
2003 | aargang == 2007 | aargang == 2009)) 
 replace saminneu = 0 if (samarb == 0 & (aargang == 1999 | aargang == 2000 | aargang == 
2003 | aargang == 2007 | aargang == 2009)) 
 replace saminnan = 0 if (samarb == 0 & (aargang == 1999 | aargang == 2000 | aargang == 
2003 | aargang == 2007 | aargang == 2009)) 
 
 replace samannn = 0 if (samarb == 0 & (aargang == 1999 | aargang == 2000 | aargang == 
2003)) 
 replace samannno = 0 if (samarb == 0 & (aargang == 1999 | aargang == 2000 | aargang == 
2003)) 
 replace samanneu = 0 if (samarb == 0 & (aargang == 1999 | aargang == 2000 | aargang == 
2003)) 
 replace samannan = 0 if (samarb == 0 & (aargang == 1999 | aargang == 2000 | aargang == 
2003)) 
  
 replace saminnreg = 0 if (samarb == 0 & aargang == 2003) 
 replace samannreg = 0 if (samarb == 0 & aargang == 2003) 
 replace samforreg = 0 if (samarb == 0 & aargang == 2003) 
 replace samuohreg = 0 if (samarb == 0 & aargang == 2003) 
  
 replace saminn = 0 if (samarb == 0 & (aargang == 2007 | aargang == 2009)) 
 replace saminnusa = 0 if (samarb == 0 & (aargang == 2007 | aargang == 2009)) 
 replace samlevn = 0 if (samarb == 0 & (aargang == 2007 | aargang == 2009)) 
 replace samlevno = 0 if (samarb == 0 & (aargang == 2007 | aargang == 2009)) 
 replace samleveu = 0 if (samarb == 0 & (aargang == 2007 | aargang == 2009)) 
 replace samlevusa = 0 if (samarb == 0 & (aargang == 2007 | aargang == 2009)) 
 replace samlevan = 0 if (samarb == 0 & (aargang == 2007 | aargang == 2009)) 
 replace samkunn = 0 if (samarb == 0 & (aargang == 2007 | aargang == 2009)) 
 replace samkunno = 0 if (samarb == 0 & (aargang == 2007 | aargang == 2009)) 
 replace samkuneu = 0 if (samarb == 0 & (aargang == 2007 | aargang == 2009)) 
 replace samkunusa = 0 if (samarb == 0 & (aargang == 2007 | aargang == 2009)) 
 replace samkunan = 0 if (samarb == 0 & (aargang == 2007 | aargang == 2009)) 
  
 replace samkonkn = 0 if (samarb == 0 & (aargang == 2007 | aargang == 2009)) 
 replace samkonkno = 0 if (samarb == 0 & (aargang == 2007 | aargang == 2009)) 
 replace samkonkeu = 0 if (samarb == 0 & (aargang == 2007 | aargang == 2009)) 
 replace samkonkusa = 0 if (samarb == 0 & (aargang == 2007 | aargang == 2009)) 
 replace samkonkan = 0 if (samarb == 0 & (aargang == 2007 | aargang == 2009)) 
  
 replace samkonsn = 0 if (samarb == 0 & (aargang == 2007 | aargang == 2009)) 
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 replace samkonsno = 0 if (samarb == 0 & (aargang == 2007 | aargang == 2009)) 
 replace samkonseu = 0 if (samarb == 0 & (aargang == 2007 | aargang == 2009)) 
 replace samkonsusa = 0 if (samarb == 0 & (aargang == 2007 | aargang == 2009)) 
 replace samkonsan = 0 if (samarb == 0 & (aargang == 2007 | aargang == 2009)) 
  
 replace samkomn = 0 if (samarb == 0 & (aargang == 2007 | aargang == 2009)) 
 replace samkomno = 0 if (samarb == 0 & (aargang == 2007 | aargang == 2009)) 
 replace samkomeu = 0 if (samarb == 0 & (aargang == 2007 | aargang == 2009)) 
 replace samkomusa = 0 if (samarb == 0 & (aargang == 2007 | aargang == 2009)) 
 replace samkoman = 0 if (samarb == 0 & (aargang == 2007 | aargang == 2009)) 
  
 replace samunin = 0 if (samarb == 0 & (aargang == 2007 | aargang == 2009)) 
 replace samunino = 0 if (samarb == 0 & (aargang == 2007 | aargang == 2009)) 
 replace samunieu = 0 if (samarb == 0 & (aargang == 2007 | aargang == 2009)) 
 replace samuniusa = 0 if (samarb == 0 & (aargang == 2007 | aargang == 2009)) 
 replace samunian = 0 if (samarb == 0 & (aargang == 2007 | aargang == 2009)) 
  
 replace samoffn = 0 if (samarb == 0 & (aargang == 2007 | aargang == 2009)) 
 replace samoffno = 0 if (samarb == 0 & (aargang == 2007 | aargang == 2009)) 
 replace samoffeu = 0 if (samarb == 0 & (aargang == 2007 | aargang == 2009)) 
 replace samoffusa = 0 if (samarb == 0 & (aargang == 2007 | aargang == 2009)) 
 replace samoffan = 0 if (samarb == 0 & (aargang == 2007 | aargang == 2009)) 
  
  
 *New products and processes 
 replace inpdgd = 0 if (inpdgd != 1 & aargang == 2008) 
 replace inpdsv = 0 if (inpdsv != 1 & aargang == 2008) 
 replace newmkt = 0 if (missing(newmkt) & (inpdgd == 0 & inpdsv == 0) & (aargang == 
2004 | aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2008)) 
 replace newmkt = inmar if (missing(newmkt) & inmar != .) 
 replace turnmar = 0 if (missing(turnmar) & newmkt == 0 & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 
2003 | aargang == 2004 | aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2008)) 
 replace turnmar = turnmar/100 if (aargang == 2003 | aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2008) 
 replace inpdgd = inpdt if (aargang == 1999 | aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2003) 
 replace inpdsv = inpcs if (aargang == 1999 | aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2003) 
 replace turnin = 0 if (missing(turnin) & (inpdgd == 0 & inpdsv == 0) & (aargang == 2000 | 
aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2003 | aargang == 2004 | aargang == 2006 | aargang == 
2008)) 
 replace turnin = turnin/100 if (aargang == 2000 | aargang == 2003 | aargang == 2006 | 
aargang == 2008) 
 
 *Employees 
replace ansatte = syss_rev if (aargang == 2002 | aargang == 2003 | aargang == 2005 | 
aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2007) 
replace ansatte = syss if (aargang == 1999 | aargang == 2000) 
replace ansatte = emp if aargang == 2001 
replace ansatte = emp04 if aargang == 2004 
 
keep if ansatte>9 
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 ***DUMMIES USED FOR DEFLATING*** 
  
 *Dummies used for deflating nominal expenditures and revenues not related to R&D - 2009 
base year 
 gen cpi = . 
 replace cpi = 1.258691 if aargang == 1999 
 replace cpi = 1.203324 if aargang == 2000 
 replace cpi = 1.166825 if aargang == 2001 
 replace cpi = 1.132457 if aargang == 2002 
 replace cpi = 1.118074 if aargang == 2003 
 replace cpi = 1.091312 if aargang == 2004 
 replace cpi = 1.086496 if aargang == 2005 
 replace cpi = 1.069505 if aargang == 2006 
 replace cpi = 1.045879 if aargang == 2007 
 replace cpi = 1.037943 if aargang == 2008 
 replace cpi = 1 if aargang == 2009 
  
 *Dummies used for deflating expenditures related to R&D. The dummies are weighted with 
average factor intensity, found from the firms reporting expenditures for wages, other 
operational costs, buildings and property, and machinery. Base year 2008 = 1. 
 gen rdcpi = . 
 replace rdcpi = 1.525036 if aargang == 1999 
 replace rdcpi = 1.423347 if aargang == 2000 
 replace rdcpi = 1.304614 if aargang == 2001 
 replace rdcpi = 1.268977 if aargang == 2002 
 replace rdcpi = 1.241073 if aargang == 2003 
 replace rdcpi = 1.209838 if aargang == 2004 
 replace rdcpi = 1.188914 if aargang == 2005 
 replace rdcpi = 1.145626 if aargang == 2006 
 replace rdcpi = 1.09198 if aargang == 2007 
 replace rdcpi = 1.036639 if aargang == 2008 
 replace rdcpi = 1 if aargang == 2009 
  
 *DEFLATING ALL EXPENSES AND REVENUES 
 *Sales 
 gen sales = omsetning*cpi if omsetning != . 
  
 *Expenditures internal R&D 
 replace intfou = intfou*rdcpi if intfou != . 
  
 *Expenditures bought R&D 
 replace xdksku = xdksku*rdcpi if xdksku != . 
 replace xdk = xdk*rdcpi if xdk != . 
   
  
  
 ***COOPERATION DUMMIES USED AS EXPLANATORY VARIABLES*** 
 *Cooperation of some nature 
 gen CO = samarb 
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 *Cooperation with foreign firm in same enterprise 
 gen MCO = . 
 replace MCO = 1 if (co12 == 1 | co13 == 1 | co14 == 1 | co15 == 1 | co16 == 1 | co17 == 1 | 
no_co12 == 1 | samkonsno == 1 | samkonseu == 1 | samkonsusa == 1 | samkonsan == 1 | 
saminnno == 1 | saminneu == 1 | saminnan == 1) 
 replace MCO = 0 if (missing(MCO) & (aargang == 1999 | aargang == 2000 | aargang == 
2001 | aargang == 2003 | aargang == 2004 | aargang == 2005 | aargang == 2006 | aargang == 
2007 | aargang == 2008 | aargang == 2009)) 
 
 *Cooperation with domestic firm in same enterprise 
 gen DCO = . 
 replace DCO = 1 if ((co11 == 1 & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2004 | aargang == 2005)) 
| (co18 == 1 & (aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2008)) | (co19 == 1 & (aargang == 2006 | 
aargang == 2008)) | (saminnreg == 1 & aargang == 2003) | (saminnn == 1 & (aargang == 
2003 | aargang == 1999 | aargang == 2000)) | (saminn == 1 & (aargang == 2009 | aargang 
== 2007))) 
 replace DCO = 0 if (missing(DCO) & (aargang == 1999 | aargang == 2000 | aargang == 
2001 | aargang == 2003 | aargang == 2004 | aargang == 2005 | aargang == 2006 | aargang == 
2007 | aargang == 2008 | aargang == 2009))  
  
 *Horizontal cooperation (competitors) 
 gen HCO = . 
 replace HCO = 1 if ((co41 == 1 & aargang == 2001) | (co21 == 1 & (aargang == 2004 | 
aargang == 2005)) | (co48 == 1 & (aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2008)) | (co49 == 1 & 
(aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2008)) | (samkonkn == 1 & (aargang == 2009 | aargang == 
2007)) | (co42 == 1 & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2008)) | (co43 == 1 
& aargang == 2001) | (co44 == 1 & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2008)) 
| (co45 == 1 & aargang == 2001) | (co46 == 1 & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2006 | 
aargang == 2008)) | (co47 == 1 & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2008)) | 
(co22 == 1 & aargang == 2005) | (no_co22 == 1 & aargang == 2004) | (co23 == 1 & 
(aargang == 2004 | aargang == 2005)) | (co24 == 1 & (aargang == 2004 | aargang == 2005)) 
| (co27 == 1 & (aargang == 2004 | aargang == 2005)) | (samkonkno == 1 & (aargang == 
2009 | aargang == 2007)) | (samkonkeu == 1 & (aargang == 2009 | aargang == 2007)) | 
(samkonkusa == 1 & (aargang == 2009 | aargang == 2007)) | (samkonkan == 1 & (aargang 
== 2009 | aargang == 2007)))  
 replace HCO = 0 if (missing(HCO) & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2004 | aargang == 
2005 | aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2007 | aargang == 2008 | aargang == 2009)) 
  
 *Vertical cooperation (customers and suppliers) 
 gen VCO = . 
 replace VCO = 1 if ((co21 == 1 & aargang == 2001) | (no_co51 == 1 & aargang == 2004) | 
(co51 == 1 & aargang == 2005) | (co28 == 1 & (aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2008)) | 
(co29 == 1 & (aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2008)) | (samlevn == 1 & (aargang == 2009 | 
aargang == 2007)) | (co31 == 1 & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2004 | aargang == 2005)) | 
(co38 == 1 & (aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2008)) | (co39 == 1 & (aargang == 2006 | 
aargang == 2008)) | (samkunn == 1 & (aargang == 2009 | aargang == 2007)) | (co22 == 1 & 
(aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2008)) | (co23 == 1 & aargang == 2001) | 
(co24 == 1 & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2008)) | (co25 == 1 & 
aargang == 2001) | (co26 == 1 & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2008)) | 
(co27 == 1 & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2008)) | (co32 == 1 & 
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aargang == 2005) | (no_co32 == 1 & aargang == 2004) | (co33 == 1 & (aargang == 2004 | 
aargang == 2005)) | (co34 == 1 & (aargang == 2004 | aargang == 2005)) | (co37 == 1 & 
(aargang == 2004 | aargang == 2005)) | (co52 == 1 & aargang == 2005) | (no_co52 == 1 & 
aargang == 2004) | (no_co53 == 1 & aargang == 2004) | (no_co54 == 1 & aargang == 2004) 
| (co53 == 1 & aargang == 2004) | (co54 == 1 & aargang == 2004) | (co57 == 1 & (aargang 
== 2004 | aargang == 2005)) | (co32 == 1 & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2006 | aargang 
== 2008)) | (co33 == 1 & aargang == 2001) | (co34 == 1 & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 
2006 | aargang == 2008)) | (co35 == 1 & aargang == 2001) | (co36 == 1 & (aargang == 2001 
| aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2008)) | (co37 == 1 & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2006 | 
aargang == 2008)) | (samkunno == 1 & (aargang == 2009 | aargang == 2007)) | (samkuneu 
== 1 & (aargang == 2009 | aargang == 2007)) | (samkunusa == 1 & (aargang == 2009 | 
aargang == 2007)) | (samkunan == 1 & (aargang == 2009 | aargang == 2007)) | (samlevno 
== 1 & (aargang == 2009 | aargang == 2007)) | (samleveu == 1 & (aargang == 2009 | 
aargang == 2007)) | (samlevusa == 1 & (aargang == 2009 | aargang == 2007)) | (samlevan 
== 1 & (aargang == 2009 | aargang == 2007))) 
 replace VCO = 0 if (missing(VCO) & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2004 | aargang == 
2005 | aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2007 | aargang == 2008 | aargang == 2009)) 
  
 *Cooperation with independent research institutions 
 gen ICO = . 
 replace ICO = 1 if ((co51 == 1 & aargang == 2001) | (co61 == 1 & aargang == 2001) | 
(co71 == 1 & aargang == 2001) | (co81 == 1 & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2004)) | 
(co41 == 1 & aargang == 2004) | (no_co61 == 1 & aargang == 2004) | (no_co71 == 1 & 
aargang == 2004) | (co58 == 1 & (aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2008)) | (co68 == 1 & 
(aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2008)) | (co78 == 1 & (aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2008)) 
| (co88 == 1 & (aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2008)) | (co59 == 1 & (aargang == 2006 | 
aargang == 2008)) | (co69 == 1 & (aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2008)) | (co79 == 1 & 
(aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2008)) | (co89 == 1 & (aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2008)) 
| (samkonsn == 1 & (aargang == 2009 | aargang == 2007)) | (samkomn == 1 & (aargang == 
2009 | aargang == 2007)) | (samunin == 1 & (aargang == 2009 | aargang == 2007)) | 
(samoffn == 1 & (aargang == 2009 | aargang == 2007)) | (samforreg == 1 & aargang == 
2003) | (samuohreg == 1 & aargang == 2003) | (samforn == 1 & (aargang == 2003 | aargang 
== 1999 | aargang == 2000)) | (samuohn == 1 & (aargang == 1999 | aargang == 2000 | 
aargang == 2003)) | (co52 == 1 & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2008)) | 
(co53 == 1 & aargang == 2001) | (co54 == 1 & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2006 | 
aargang == 2008)) | (co55 == 1 & (aargang == 2008 | aargang == 2001)) | (co56 == 1 & 
(aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2008)) | (co57 == 1 & (aargang == 2001 | 
aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2008)) | (co62 == 1 & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2005 | 
aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2008)) | (co63 == 1 & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2005)) | 
(co64 == 1 & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2005 | aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2008)) | 
(co65 == 1 & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2008)) | (co66 == 1 & (aargang == 2001 | 
aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2008)) | (co67 == 1 & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2004 | 
aargang == 2005 | aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2008)) | (co72 == 1 & (aargang == 2001 | 
aargang == 2005 | aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2008)) | (co73 == 1 & (aargang == 2001 | 
aargang == 2005)) | (co74 == 1 & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2005 | aargang == 2006 | 
aargang == 2008)) | (co75 == 1 & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2008)) | (co76 == 1 & 
(aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2008)) | (co77 == 1 & (aargang == 2001 | 
aargang == 2004 | aargang == 2005 | aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2008)) | (co82 == 1 & 
(aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2004 | aargang == 2005 | aargang == 2006 | aargang == 
2008)) | (co83 == 1 & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2004 | aargang == 2005)) | (co84 == 1 
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& (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2004 | aargang == 2005 | aargang == 2006 | aargang == 
2008)) | (co85 == 1 & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 2008)) | (co86 == 1 & (aargang == 
2001 | aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2008)) | (co87 == 1 & (aargang == 2001 | aargang == 
2004 | aargang == 2005 | aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2008)) | (no_co42 == 1 & aargang 
== 2004) | (co42 == 1 & aargang == 2005) | (co43 == 1 & (aargang == 2004 | aargang == 
2005)) | (co44 == 1 & (aargang == 2004 | aargang == 2005)) | (co47 == 1 & (aargang == 
2004 | aargang == 2005)) | (no_co62 == 1 & aargang == 2004) | (no_co63 == 1 & aargang 
== 2004) | (no_co64 == 1 & aargang == 2004) | (no_co72 == 1 & aargang == 2004) | 
(no_co73 == 1 & aargang == 2004) | (no_co74 == 1 & aargang == 2004) | (samkonsno == 1 
& (aargang == 2009 | aargang == 2007)) | (samkonseu == 1 & (aargang == 2009 | aargang 
== 2007)) | (samkonsusa == 1 & (aargang == 2009 | aargang == 2007)) | (samkonsan == 1 & 
(aargang == 2009 | aargang == 2007)) | (samkomno == 1 & (aargang == 2009 | aargang == 
2007)) | (samkomeu == 1 & (aargang == 2009 | aargang == 2007)) | (samkomusa == 1 & 
(aargang == 2009 | aargang == 2007)) | (samkoman == 1 & (aargang == 2009 | aargang == 
2007)) | (samunino == 1 & (aargang == 2009 | aargang == 2007)) | (samunieu == 1 & 
(aargang == 2009 | aargang == 2007)) | (samuniusa == 1 & (aargang == 2009 | aargang == 
2007)) | (samunian == 1 & (aargang == 2009 | aargang == 2007)) | (samoffno == 1 & 
(aargang == 2009 | aargang == 2007)) | (samoffeu == 1 & (aargang == 2009 | aargang == 
2007)) | (samoffusa == 1 & (aargang == 2009 | aargang == 2007)) | (samoffan == 1 & 
(aargang == 2009 | aargang == 2007)) | (samuohno == 1 & (aargang == 1999 | aargang == 
2000 | aargang == 2003)) | (samuoheu == 1 & (aargang == 1999 | aargang == 2000 | aargang 
== 2003)) | (samuohan == 1 & (aargang == 1999 | aargang == 2000 | aargang == 2003)) | 
(samforno == 1 & (aargang == 1999 | aargang == 2000 | aargang == 2003)) | (samforeu == 1 
& (aargang == 1999 | aargang == 2000 | aargang == 2003)) | (samforan == 1 & (aargang == 
1999 | aargang == 2000 | aargang == 2003)))  
 replace ICO = 0 if (missing(ICO) & (aargang == 1999 | aargang == 2000 | aargang == 2001 
| aargang == 2003 | aargang == 2004 | aargang == 2005 | aargang == 2006 | aargang == 2007 
| aargang == 2008 | aargang == 2009)) 
  
*Logarithm of internal R&D expenditures 
gen ird = ln(1+(1000*intfou)) if intfou != . 
 
*Logarithm of external R&D expenditures 
gen erd = ln(1+(1000*xdk)) if xdk != . 
 
*Logarithm of external R&D expenditures (R&D bought from foreign firm in same 
enterprise) 
gen merd = ln(1+(1000*xdksku)) if xdksku != . 
 
*External R&D expenditures (R&D bought outside the enterprise) 
gen xdkothers = xdk-xdksku if (xdk != . & xdksku != .) 
gen oerd = ln(1+(1000*xdkothers)) if xdkothers != . 
 
*Sales 
gen sale = ln(1+(1000*sales)) if sales != . 
 
 
***VARIABLES FOR COMPLEMENTARITY 
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***YEAR DUMMIES TO CONTROL FOR EXOGENOUS SHOCKS 
 gen D01 = 1 if aargang == 1999 
 replace D01 = 0 if missing(D01) 
 gen D02 = 1 if aargang == 2000 
 replace D02 = 0 if missing(D02) 
 gen D03 = 1 if aargang == 2001 
 replace D03 = 0 if missing(D03) 
 gen D04 = 1 if aargang == 2002 
 replace D04 = 0 if missing(D04) 
 gen D05 = 1 if aargang == 2003 
 replace D05 = 0 if missing(D05) 
 gen D06 = 1 if aargang == 2004 
 replace D06 = 0 if missing(D06) 
 gen D07 = 1 if aargang == 2005 
 replace D07 = 0 if missing(D07) 
 gen D08 = 1 if aargang == 2006 
 replace D08 = 0 if missing(D08) 
 gen D09 = 1 if aargang == 2007 
 replace D09 = 0 if missing(D09) 
 gen D10 = 1 if aargang == 2008 
 replace D10 = 0 if missing(D10) 
 gen D2009 = 1 if aargang == 2009 
 replace D2009 = 0 if missing(D2009) 
  
 ***CALCULATING THE WEIGHTED AVERAGE USED FOR DEFLATING THE 
EXPENDITURES AND REVENUES ASSOCIATED WITH R&D 
 *gen intfou2 = intfou if (intfou != . & bygn != . & mask != . & adk != . & lonn != .) 
 *replace intfou2 = intfou if (intfou != . & lonn != . & adk != . & inv != . & aargang == 
2002) 
 *bysort aargang: sum intfou2 lonn adk bygn mask inv if intfou2 != . 
 *From the means provided by the sum function we can calculate the weight each post has in 
the internal R&D expenses 
 *For the year 2002 the firms are not asked to specify the amount used on buildings and 
property, and machinery. These to are merged into a post called investments. 
 *So we have calculated the average weights that these to posts have in the other words, and 
weighted the investment post accordingly. 
  
  
gen year = 1 if aargang == 2001 
replace year = 2 if aargang == 2003 
replace year = 3 if aargang == 2004 
replace year = 4 if aargang == 2006  
replace year = 5 if aargang == 2008 
 
  
  
generate D11 = 1 if year == 1 
replace D11 = 0 if missing(D11) 
generate D12 = 1 if year == 2 
replace D12 = 0 if missing(D12) 
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generate D13 = 1 if year == 3 
replace D13 = 0 if missing(D13) 
generate D14 = 1 if year == 4 
replace D14 = 0 if missing(D14) 
gen D15 = 1 if year == 5 
replace D15 = 0 if missing(D15) 
 
 *Generate innovasjon_egen: dummy on whether or not the firm has made product or 
process innovation  
 gen innovasjon = . 
 replace innovasjon = 1 if ((inpdgd == 1 & inpdsv == 0) | (inpdgd == 0 & inpdsv == 1) | 
(inpdgd == 1 & inpdsv == 1)) 
 replace innovasjon = 0 if (inpdgd == 0 & inpdsv == 0) 
 gen innovasjon_egen = 1 if (innovasjon == 1 & inpdtw == 1 | innovasjon == 1 & inpcsw == 
1) 
 replace innovasjon_egen = 0 if ((innovasjon == 1 & (inpdtw == 2 | inpdtw == 3)) | 
innovasjon == 0) 
  
 *Finding average measurements for explanatory variables 
 
xtset id aargang, yearly 
  
gen sales3 = (l2.sales + sales + l.sales)/3 if (l2.sales != . & sales != . & l.sales != .) 
replace sales3 = (l2.sales + sales)/2 if (l2.sales != . & sales != . & l.sales == .) 
replace sales3 = (l2.sales + l.sales)/2 if (l2.sales != . & sales == . & l.sales != .) 
replace sales3 = (sales + l.sales)/2 if (l2.sales == . & sales != . & l.sales != .) 
replace sales3 = l2.sales if (l2.sales != . & sales == . & l.sales == .) 
replace sales3 = sales if (l2.sales == . & sales != . & l.sales == .) 
replace sales3 = l.sales if (l2.sales == . & sales == . & l.sales != .) 
 
gen sale3 = ln(1000*sales3 + 1) 
 
gen intfou3 = (l2.intfou + intfou + l.intfou)/3 if (l2.intfou != . & intfou != . & l.intfou != .) 
replace intfou3 = (l2.intfou + intfou)/2 if (l2.intfou != . & intfou != . & l.intfou == .) 
replace intfou3 = (l2.intfou + l.intfou)/2 if (l2.intfou != . & intfou == . & l.intfou != .) 
replace intfou3 = (intfou + l.intfou)/2 if (l2.intfou == . & intfou != . & l.intfou != .) 
replace intfou3 = l2.intfou if (l2.intfou != . & intfou == . & l.intfou == .) 
replace intfou3 = intfou if (l2.intfou == . & intfou != . & l.intfou == .) 
replace intfou3 = l.intfou if (l2.intfou == . & intfou == . & l.intfou != .) 
 
gen ird3 = ln(1000*intfou3 + 1) 
 
gen xdksku3 = (l2.xdksku + xdksku + l.xdksku)/3 if (l2.xdksku != . & xdksku != . & 
l.xdksku != .) 
replace xdksku3 = (l2.xdksku + xdksku)/2 if (l2.xdksku != . & xdksku != . & l.xdksku == .) 
replace xdksku3 = (l2.xdksku + l.xdksku)/2 if (l2.xdksku != . & xdksku == . & l.xdksku != .) 
replace xdksku3 = (xdksku + l.xdksku)/2 if (l2.xdksku == . & xdksku != . & l.xdksku != .) 
replace xdksku3 = l2.xdksku if (l2.xdksku != . & xdksku == . & l.xdksku == .) 
replace xdksku3 = xdksku if (l2.xdksku == . & xdksku != . & l.xdksku == .) 
replace xdksku3 = l.xdksku if (l2.xdksku == . & xdksku == . & l.xdksku != .) 
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gen merd3 = ln(1000*xdksku3 + 1) 
 
gen xdkothers3 = (l2.xdkothers + xdkothers + l.xdkothers)/3 if (l2.xdkothers != . & 
xdkothers != . & l.xdkothers != .) 
replace xdkothers3 = (l2.xdkothers + xdkothers)/2 if (l2.xdkothers != . & xdkothers != . & 
l.xdkothers == .) 
replace xdkothers3 = (l2.xdkothers + l.xdkothers)/2 if (l2.xdkothers != . & xdkothers == . & 
l.xdkothers != .) 
replace xdkothers3 = (xdkothers + l.xdkothers)/2 if (l2.xdkothers == . & xdkothers != . & 
l.xdkothers != .) 
replace xdkothers3 = l2.xdkothers if (l2.xdkothers != . & xdkothers == . & l.xdkothers == .) 
replace xdkothers3 = xdkothers if (l2.xdkothers == . & xdkothers != . & l.xdkothers == .) 
replace xdkothers3 = l.xdkothers if (l2.xdkothers == . & xdkothers == . & l.xdkothers != .) 
 
gen oerd3 = ln(xdkothers3 + 1) 
 
gen MCO3 = 1 if (MCO == 1 | l.MCO == 1 | l2.MCO == 1) 
replace MCO3 = 0 if (MCO == 0 & l.MCO == 0 & l2.MCO == 0) 
replace MCO3 = 0 if (MCO == 0 & l.MCO == . & l2.MCO == 0) 
replace MCO3 = 0 if (MCO == 0 & l.MCO == 0 & l2.MCO == .) 
replace MCO3 = 0 if (MCO == . & l.MCO == 0 & l2.MCO == 0) 
replace MCO3 = 0 if (MCO == . & l.MCO == . & l2.MCO == 0) 
replace MCO3 = 0 if (MCO == . & l.MCO == 0 & l2.MCO == .)  
replace MCO3 = 0 if (MCO == 0 & l.MCO == . & l2.MCO == .) 
 
gen DCO3 = 1 if (DCO == 1 | l.DCO == 1 | l2.DCO == 1) 
replace DCO3 = 0 if (DCO == 0 & l.DCO == 0 & l2.DCO == 0) 
replace DCO3 = 0 if (DCO == 0 & l.DCO == . & l2.DCO == 0) 
replace DCO3 = 0 if (DCO == 0 & l.DCO == 0 & l2.DCO == .) 
replace DCO3 = 0 if (DCO == . & l.DCO == 0 & l2.DCO == 0) 
replace DCO3 = 0 if (DCO == . & l.DCO == . & l2.DCO == 0) 
replace DCO3 = 0 if (DCO == . & l.DCO == 0 & l2.DCO == .)  
replace DCO3 = 0 if (DCO == 0 & l.DCO == . & l2.DCO == .) 
 
gen HCO3 = 1 if (HCO == 1 | l.HCO == 1 | l2.HCO == 1) 
replace HCO3 = 0 if (HCO == 0 & l.HCO == 0 & l2.HCO == 0) 
replace HCO3 = 0 if (HCO == 0 & l.HCO == . & l2.HCO == 0) 
replace HCO3 = 0 if (HCO == 0 & l.HCO == 0 & l2.HCO == .) 
replace HCO3 = 0 if (HCO == . & l.HCO == 0 & l2.HCO == 0) 
replace HCO3 = 0 if (HCO == . & l.HCO == . & l2.HCO == 0) 
replace HCO3 = 0 if (HCO == . & l.HCO == 0 & l2.HCO == .)  
replace HCO3 = 0 if (HCO == 0 & l.HCO == . & l2.HCO == .) 
 
gen VCO3 = 1 if (VCO == 1 | l.VCO == 1 | l2.VCO == 1) 
replace VCO3 = 0 if (VCO == 0 & l.VCO == 0 & l2.VCO == 0) 
replace VCO3 = 0 if (VCO == 0 & l.VCO == . & l2.VCO == 0) 
replace VCO3 = 0 if (VCO == 0 & l.VCO == 0 & l2.VCO == .) 
replace VCO3 = 0 if (VCO == . & l.VCO == 0 & l2.VCO == 0) 
replace VCO3 = 0 if (VCO == . & l.VCO == . & l2.VCO == 0) 
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replace VCO3 = 0 if (VCO == . & l.VCO == 0 & l2.VCO == .)  
replace VCO3 = 0 if (VCO == 0 & l.VCO == . & l2.VCO == .) 
 
gen ICO3 = 1 if (ICO == 1 | l.ICO == 1 | l2.ICO == 1) 
replace ICO3 = 0 if (ICO == 0 & l.ICO == 0 & l2.ICO == 0) 
replace ICO3 = 0 if (ICO == 0 & l.ICO == . & l2.ICO == 0) 
replace ICO3 = 0 if (ICO == 0 & l.ICO == 0 & l2.ICO == .) 
replace ICO3 = 0 if (ICO == . & l.ICO == 0 & l2.ICO == 0) 
replace ICO3 = 0 if (ICO == . & l.ICO == . & l2.ICO == 0) 
replace ICO3 = 0 if (ICO == . & l.ICO == 0 & l2.ICO == .)  
replace ICO3 = 0 if (ICO == 0 & l.ICO == . & l2.ICO == .) 
 
gen irdmerd3 = ird3*merd3 if (ird3 != . & merd3 != .) 
gen irdoerd3 = ird3*oerd3 if (ird3 != . & merd3 != .) 
gen irdMCO3 = ird3*MCO3 if (ird3 != . & MCO3 != .) 
gen irdDCO3 = ird3*DCO3 if (ird3 != . & DCO3 != .) 
gen irdHCO3 = ird3*HCO3 if (ird3 != . & HCO3 != .) 
gen irdICO3 = ird3*ICO3 if (ird3 != . & ICO3 != .) 
gen irdVCO3 = ird3*VCO3 if (ird3 != . & VCO3 != .) 
 
gen industri = 0 
replace industri = 1 if (nace1 < 50 & aargang != 2008) 
replace industri = 1 if (nace1 < 45 & aargang == 2008) 
 
xtset id aargang, yearly 
bysort id: gen nyear=[_N] 
keep if nyear != 1 
 
gen nace2 = int(nace1) 
xi i.nace2 
 
save fou2 
 
 
**** Regressions 
clear 
 
*CHAPTER 3 
 
*Table 3.Ø 
use fou2 
xtset id aargang, yearly 
reg ird erd CO _Inace2* D01-D2009, robust 
xtreg ird erd CO  D01-D2009, fe robust 
reg ird merd oerd CO _Inace2* D01-D2009, robust 
xtreg ird merd oerd CO  D01-D2009, fe robust 
reg ird merd oerd MCO DCO HCO VCO ICO _Inace2* D01-D2009, robust 
xtreg ird merd oerd MCO DCO HCO VCO ICO D01-D2009, fe robust 
clear  
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*Table 3.Ø Small firms 
use fou2 
xtset id aargang, yearly 
keep if ansatte < 50 
reg ird merd oerd MCO DCO HCO VCO ICO _Inace2* D01-D2009, robust 
xtreg ird merd oerd MCO DCO HCO VCO ICO D01-D2009, fe robust 
clear 
 
*Table 3.Ø Medium firms 
use fou2 
xtset id aargang, yearly 
keep if (ansatte > 49 & ansatte < 250) 
reg ird merd oerd MCO DCO HCO VCO ICO _Inace2* D01-D2009, robust 
xtreg ird merd oerd MCO DCO HCO VCO ICO D01-D2009, fe robust 
clear 
 
*Table 3.Ø Large firms 
use fou2 
xtset id aargang, yearly 
keep if ansatte > 249 
reg ird merd oerd MCO DCO HCO VCO ICO _Inace2* D01-D2009, robust 
xtreg ird merd oerd MCO DCO HCO VCO ICO D01-D2009, fe robust 
clear 
 
*Table 3.Ø Manufacturers 
use fou2 
xtset id aargang, yearly 
keep if industri == 1 
reg ird merd oerd MCO DCO HCO VCO ICO _Inace2* D01-D2009, robust 
xtreg ird merd oerd MCO DCO HCO VCO ICO D01-D2009, fe robust 
clear 
 
*Table 3.Ø Service 
use fou2 
xtset id aargang, yearly 
keep if industri == 0 
reg ird merd oerd MCO DCO HCO VCO ICO _Inace2* D01-D2009, robust 
xtreg ird merd oerd MCO DCO HCO VCO ICO D01-D2009, fe robust 
clear 
 
*CHAPTER 4 
 
*Table 4.Ø  
use fou2 
xtset id year, yearly 
reg turnin ird3 erd3 irderd3 CO3 irdCO3 sale3 _Inace2* D11-D15, robust 
xtreg turnin ird3 erd3 irderd3 CO3 irdCO3 sale3 D11-D15, fe robust 
probit innovasjon ird3 erd3 irderd3 CO3 irdCO3 sale3 _Inace2* D11-D15 
mfx compute 
clear 
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*Table 4.Ø 
use fou2 
reg turnin ird3 merd3 irdmerd3 oerd3 irdoerd3 MCO3 irdMCO3 DCO3 irdDCO3 HCO3 
irdHCO3 VCO3 irdVCO3 ICO3 irdICO3 sale3 _Inace2*  D11-D15, robust 
xtreg turnin ird3 merd3 irdmerd3 oerd3 irdoerd3 MCO3 irdMCO3 DCO3 irdDCO3 HCO3 
irdHCO3 VCO3 irdVCO3 ICO3 irdICO3 sale3 D11-D15, fe robust 
probit innovasjon ird3 merd3 irdmerd3 oerd3 irdoerd3 MCO3 irdMCO3 DCO3 irdDCO3 
HCO3 irdHCO3 VCO3 irdVCO3 ICO3 irdICO3 sale3 _Inace2* D11-D15 
mfx compute 
clear 
 
*Table 4.Ø Small firms 
use fou2 
keep if ansatte < 50 
xtreg turnin ird3 merd3 irdmerd3 oerd3 irdoerd3 MCO3 irdMCO3 DCO3 irdDCO3 HCO3 
irdHCO3 VCO3 irdVCO3 ICO3 irdICO3 sale3 D11-D15, fe robust 
probit innovasjon ird3 merd3 irdmerd3 oerd3 irdoerd3 MCO3 irdMCO3 DCO3 irdDCO3 
HCO3 irdHCO3 VCO3 irdVCO3 ICO3 irdICO3 sale3 _Inace2* D11-D15 
mfx compute 
clear 
 
*Table 4.Ø Medium firms 
use fou2 
keep if (ansatte > 49 & ansatte < 250) 
xtreg turnin ird3 merd3 irdmerd3 oerd3 irdoerd3 MCO3 irdMCO3 DCO3 irdDCO3 HCO3 
irdHCO3 VCO3 irdVCO3 ICO3 irdICO3 sale3 D11-D15, fe robust 
probit innovasjon ird3 merd3 irdmerd3 oerd3 irdoerd3 MCO3 irdMCO3 DCO3 irdDCO3 
HCO3 irdHCO3 VCO3 irdVCO3 ICO3 irdICO3 sale3 _Inace2* D11-D15 
mfx compute 
clear 
 
*Table 4.Ø Large firms 
use fou2 
keep if ansatte > 249 
xtreg turnin ird3 merd3 irdmerd3 oerd3 irdoerd3 MCO3 irdMCO3 DCO3 irdDCO3 HCO3 
irdHCO3 VCO3 irdVCO3 ICO3 irdICO3 sale3 D11-D15, fe robust 
probit innovasjon ird3 merd3 irdmerd3 oerd3 irdoerd3 MCO3 irdMCO3 DCO3 irdDCO3 
HCO3 irdHCO3 VCO3 irdVCO3 ICO3 irdICO3 sale3 _Inace2* D11-D15 
mfx compute 
clear 
 
*Table 4.Ø Manufacturers 
use fou2 
keep if industri == 1 
xtreg turnin ird3 merd3 irdmerd3 oerd3 irdoerd3 MCO3 irdMCO3 DCO3 irdDCO3 HCO3 
irdHCO3 VCO3 irdVCO3 ICO3 irdICO3 sale3 D11-D15, fe robust 
probit innovasjon ird3 merd3 irdmerd3 oerd3 irdoerd3 MCO3 irdMCO3 DCO3 irdDCO3 
HCO3 irdHCO3 VCO3 irdVCO3 ICO3 irdICO3 sale3 _Inace2* D11-D15 
mfx compute 
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clear 
 
*Table 4.Ø Services 
use fou2 
keep if industri == 0 
xtreg turnin ird3 merd3 irdmerd3 oerd3 irdoerd3 MCO3 irdMCO3 DCO3 irdDCO3 HCO3 
irdHCO3 VCO3 irdVCO3 ICO3 irdICO3 sale3 D11-D15, fe robust 
probit innovasjon ird3 merd3 irdmerd3 oerd3 irdoerd3 MCO3 irdMCO3 DCO3 irdDCO3 
HCO3 irdHCO3 VCO3 irdVCO3 ICO3 irdICO3 sale3 _Inace2* D11-D15 
mfx compute 
clear 
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